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Abstract 
Thanks to the reforms within the last 15 years, the forms-based approach of the 
European Union Competition Policy has evolved into an effects-based approach which 
gives importance to consumer welfare and economic analysis. One of the most 
important developments in this reform process is the publication of the Guidance on the 
Commission‘s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings at the end of 2008.  
The main goal of the study is to discover how the transformation from forms-
based approach into effects-based approach has reflected on Turkish Competition 
Authority decisions about predatory pricing, rebates, refusal to supply, margin squeeze 
and exclusive dealing agreements. In the name of these effects, relevant Turkish 
Competition Authority decisions on the abuse of dominant position in exclusionary 
practices between 2009 and 2013 have been evaluated under the light of European 
Union decisions and the Guidance.  
Consequently, it has been argued that after 2009, European Union is more 
consistent to adopt an effect-based approach. On the other hand, Turkish Competition 
Authority decisions do not show a consistent and clear tendency towards effects-based 
approach. However, Turkey takes European Union Competition Policy as a model to 
itself and the publication of The Draft for Guidance on the Assessment of Abusive 
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings may show Turkey will follow more 
effects-based approach in the future. In such a case Turkish Competition Authority may 
be required to evaluate positive and negative sides of the guidance and whether Turkey 
really needs it. 
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Özet 
Son 15 yılda yapılan reformlar sayesinde Avrupa Birliği Rekabet 
Politikası‘ndaki şekilci yaklaşım ekonomik analize ve tüketici refahına önem veren etki 
temelli bir yaklaşıma dönüşmüştür. Bu reform sürecindeki en önemli gelişmelerden biri 
2008 yılının sonunca yayınlanan, Komisyon‘un AT Anlaşması‘nın 82. Maddesinin 
Uygulanmasına İlişkin Hâkim Durumdaki Teşebbüslerin Dışlayıcı Uygulamalarına 
Yönelik Öncelikleri Rehberi‘dir.  
Bu çalışmanın temel amacı Avrupa Birliği Rekabet Politikası‘nın şekilci 
yaklaşımdan etki temelli yaklaşıma geçmesinin Türk Rekabet Kurumu'nun yıkıcı 
fiyatlama, indirim sistemleri, mal vermeyi reddetme, fiyat sıkıştırması ve münhasırlık 
anlaşmaları ile ilgili kararlarına nasıl yansıdığının ortaya çıkarılmasıdır. Sözü edilen 
etkilerin açığa çıkarılması amacıyla Türk Rekabet Kurumu‘nun 2009-2013 yılları 
arasında çıkarmış olduğu hâkim durumun kötüye kullanımında dışlayıcı uygulamalar 
üzerine olan seçilmiş kararları Avrupa Birliği kararları ve Rehber ışığında analiz 
edilmiştir. 
Sonuç olarak, Avrupa Birliği‘nin özellikle 2009 sonrasında etki bazlı yaklaşımı  
benimsemede daha tutarlı olduğu görülmüştür. Türkiye Rekabet Kurumu kararlarında 
ise etki bazlı yaklaşım konusunda açık ve tutarlı bir eğilim görülmemiştir. Ancak 
Rekabet Politikası konusunda Avrupa Birliği‘ni kendisine model alan Türkiye‘nin, 
Hâkim Durumdaki Teşebbüslerin Dışlayıcı Kötüye Kullanma Niteliğindeki 
Davranışlarının Değerlendirilmesine İlişkin Kılavuz Taslağı hazırlamış olması, bir 
rehber çıkararak gelecekte daha etki bazlı bir yaklaşım benimseyeceğini gösterebilir. 
Böyle bir durumda Türk Rekabet Kurumu‘nun bu rehberin olumlu ve olumsuz yanlarını 
ve bu konuda gerçekten bir rehbere ihtiyacı olup olmadığını değerlendirmesi 
gerekmektedir.  
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INTRODUCTION: 
 
Abuse of dominant position through exclusionary practices such as predatory 
pricing, loyalty rebates, refusal to supply, margin squeeze and exclusive dealing 
agreements hinders the growth of competition in the market and reduces welfare. To 
ensure functioning of the market, practices which are detrimental to competition should 
be analyzed. There are two approaches through which a competition authority decides 
on whether the practice destroys competition or not.  The first approach is forms-based 
or per se approach in which engaging in abusive practice is considered per se illegal due 
to the fact that it is written in the law. The plaintiff is punished because anti-competitive 
effect of a practice is theoretically proven. The second approach is effects-based 
approach through which the competition authority examines justifications and specific 
consequences of anti-competitive behaviors. Here, all relevant competitive market 
structure is taken into account. Efficiencies such as economies of scale and cost 
efficiencies and effects on consumer welfare are investigated unlike the forms-based 
approach which does not require a detailed assessment of the behavior.
1
 
 
In the last 15 years, the EU Competition Policy has been evolving from a 
predominantly forms-based approach to effects-based approach. A reform process has 
been initiated in the EU Law with regard to the abuse of the dominant position and 
exclusionary conduct.
2
 The Discussion Paper
3
 published in 2005 was followed by the 
Guidance on the Commission‘s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (Guidance) in 
2009.
4
 The goal of these reforms is to evaluate abusive practices through a detailed and 
                                                 
1
  Federico Etro and Ioannis Kokkoris, ―Chapter 1: Toward an Economic Approach to 
Article 102‖ in Competition Law and the Enforcement of Art. 102, Etro and Kokkoris 
(eds.), (Oxford Univ. Press, 2010), p.1, Yannis Katsoulacos  and David Ulph, ―Chapter 
4: Optimal Enforcement and Decision Structures for Competition Policy: Economic 
Considerations‖ in in Competition Law and the Enforcement of Art. 102, Etro and 
Kokkoris (eds.), (Oxford Univ. Press, 2010), p. 89-91. 
2
 Abuse of dominant position (Article 102 TFEU), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/ 
3
 DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
Exclusionary Abuses (Discussion Paper), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf 
4
 ―Communication from the Commission Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
 2 
 
clear approach. In order to keep up with these developments, the Turkish Competition 
Law broadly follows the EU example and makes some adjustments built upon Article 6 
of the Act No 4054 of Turkish Competition Law
5
 and EU Competition Law consisting 
of the decisions of Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European 
Commission.  
 
Thus, this study aims at analyzing the abuse of the dominant position decisions 
on exclusionary practices in Turkey between 2009 and 2013 in relation to EU decisions 
that were made after the publication of Guidance in 2009. The impacts of the EU reform 
process on the Commission, CJEU and Turkish Competition Authority (CA), the 
compatibility of the decisions with the Guidance and the evolution of the approach from 
a forms-based to effects-based are examined. 
 
For analyzing this issue, I divided the thesis into 4 parts. The first chapter 
presents an overview and analysis of Article 102, the Discussion Paper and the 
Guidance. Chapter 2 analyzes relevant EU cases chosen from the period between 2009 
and 2013 under five subheadings each of which representing a type of exclusionary 
behavior. For predatory pricing, Post Danmark; for rebates, Tomra and Intel decisions; 
for refusal to supply, Telekomunikacja Polska decision; for margin squeeze, Telia 
Sonaria decision; and finally for exclusive dealing, EDF and Soda ash decisions are 
examined. 
 
The third chapter is concentrated on relevant cases from Turkey between 2009 
and 2013. The subtitles are again the same. For predatory pricing, Knauf, THY, TDI 
decisions; for rebates, DMG, Kalekim and Kale Kilit decisions; for refusal to supply, 
Sanofi Aventis, Türk Telekom and CNR decisions; for margin squeeze, TTNET I, 
TTNET II decision, Turkcell‘s 2010 decision and finally for exclusive dealing Mey İçki 
and Turkcell‘s 2011 decisions are examined.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
dominant undertakings‖, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:045:0007:0020:EN:PDF 
5
 The Act No 4054, Abuse of Dominant Position, Article 6, 
http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/default.aspx?nsw=j6VYScQKgFG/oIWFwqUaBQ==-
SgKWD+pQItw= 
 3 
 
The cases in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are chosen because they either the most 
debated or the most relevant cases. As for the subtitles for both Chapter 2 and Chapter 
3, I did not include tying and bundling, which is mentioned in the Guidance, since the 
amount of tying and bundling cases is very low both Turkey and EU during the period 
examined in this study. Here I should emphasize that I am not doing a one-to-one 
systematic comparison between EU and Turkish cases. What I am not doing is to 
evaluate at Turkish cases through EU lenses. The fourth part presents a summary and 
conclusions.  
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CHAPTER 1: GUIDANCE ON ARTICLE 102 (EX. ARTICLE 82) 
ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES
6
 
  
Being published 3 December 2008, the Guidance on the Commission's 
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty (TEC) to Abusive 
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings has 14 pages and 4 chapters; 
Introduction, Purpose of the Document, General Approach to Exclusionary Conduct, 
and Specific Forms of Abuse. It reveals the changing approach in the abuse of dominant 
position cases in the EU from forms-based approach to an effects-based approach. The 
document itself is the product of EU reforms on the abuse of dominant position cases. 
The main goal of the reforms is to have an effects-based approach instead of forms-
based one for analyzing the abuse of dominant position cases in general. 
 
Article 82 of the TEC has been in force since the Treaty of Rome that was 
signed in 1957. The content has not changed since then. However, the number of the 
article has become 102 with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, when the EC Treaty and the 
Rome Treaty were transformed into the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). Very basically, the article prohibits the abuse of the dominant position. 
Reform of the article was initiated through the publication of the DG Competition 
Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses 
that was published in 2005.
7
 The Discussion Paper is about the exclusionary conduct of 
the abuse of the dominant position and the scope of the reforms related to Article 82. It 
was widely circulated and was subject to intense public consultation. Thus, the 
Guidance, which builds on the Discussion Paper, was not an immediate transformation; 
it was the result of a review and reform process
8
. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Communication from the Commission Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings (Guidance), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:045:0007:0020:EN:PDF 
7
 DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
Exclusionary Abuses (Discussion Paper), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf 
8
 Abuse of dominant position (Article 102 TFEU), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/ 
 5 
 
1.1.Article 102 (ex. Article 82 TEC):
9
 
 
The full Article 102 states: 
“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade 
between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:  
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other 
unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice 
of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according 
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts”. 
 
Article 102 of TFEU says that abuse of the dominant position is prohibited. It 
includes both single dominance and the collective dominance. The types of the abuse of 
dominant position are exploitative and exclusionary practices. Exploitative practices are 
related to the exploitation of market power to harm customers directly. Price 
discrimination and excessive pricing can be considered as exploitative practices.
10
 On 
the other hand, exclusionary practices aim to maintain the market power by harming 
rivals.   The practices include exclusive dealing, predatory pricing, loyalty rebates, tying 
and bundling, refusal to supply and margin squeeze.
11
 
 
                                                 
9
 Article 102 (ex Article 82 TEC), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E102:EN:NOT 
10
 Pınar Akman, ―Exploitative Abuse in Article 82EC: Back to Basics?‖ CCP Working 
Paper 09-1, 2008, p. 4.  
11
 Massimo Motta M. and Alexandre de Streel. ―Exploitative and Exclusionary 
Excessive Prices in EU Law,‖ the paper presented in 8th Annual European Union 
Competition Workshop, Florence, June 2003, p. 1.  
 6 
 
  Article 102 is the backbone of the EU Competition Policy. According to Lowe, 
approximately one quarter of the investigations of the Commission is about Article 102. 
There are also cases involving both Article 101
12
 & 102. At the end, it can be said that 
almost half of the cases involve Article 102
13
 since the formation of EU.  Besides, the 
highest fine imposed since the very beginning is the one for the infringement of Article 
102
14
. Therefore, the way the Commission interprets Article 102 is highly essential. In 
fact, there have been changes in Article 101, which is related to restrictive agreements 
and acquisitions and many documents and guidelines have been published since in the 
1990s. All these developments in Article 101 aimed at adopting an effects-based 
approach.
15
 
 
On the other hand, Article 102 is still the same since 1957. Despite that, the 
Commission‘s interpretation of the articles has changed through time. The first and 
foremost reason for this transformation in the way Article 102 was analyzed is the 
increasing economic integration of the EU. Through time, the trade barriers were lifted; 
the internal market of the EU became a single market that guarantees four freedoms that 
are free movement of good, capital, services and people. In that kind of an environment, 
an effective Competition Policy can help to have a free and fair trade and the EU single 
                                                 
12
 Article 101(ex Article 81) is the another Competiton Rule of the EU applying to the 
undertakings, in case of restrictive agreements, See http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E101:en:NOT for further 
details. 
13
 European Competition Network Statistics,  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/statistics.html#3, Lowe, Philip, 11 February 2009, 
―The European Commission Formulates its Enforcement Priorities as Regards 
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings‖, Global Competition Policy, 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/the-european-commission-formulates-
its-enforcement-priorities-as-regards-exclusionary-conduct-by-dominant-undertakings/ 
14
 In COMP/37.990 Intel, Commission Decision of 13 May 2009, the Commission 
imposed a record fine which is EUR 1.06 billion., Pınar Akman, ―AB Komisyonu 102. 
Madde Kılavızu Işığında Hakim Durumun Kötüye Kullanılması Reformuna Dair 
Eleştiriler ve Öneriler‖, Hakim Durumun Kötüye Kullanılması: Sorunlar ve Çözüm 
Önerileri, edt. Kerem Cem Sanlı, (On İki Levha Yayınları:İstanbul, 2010), pp. 69-91, p. 
69-70. 
15
 Press Release: ―Antitrust: Guidance on Commission Enformcement Priorities in 
Applying Article 82 to Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Firms-frequently asked 
questions,‖ MEMO/08/761, 03.12.2008.  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
08-761_en.htm 
 7 
 
market to reach its full potential.
16
 The second reason for the change in the analysis is 
stated by Lowe. According to him, economic evidence and theory have gained 
importance for being able to understand how the markets work.
17
 In fact, Article has 
been considered as ‗not-modern‘ and outdated. Marden and Gormsen argue that Article 
102 was affected from ―Ordoliberalism‖ that aims to protect the competitors rather than 
the competition itself. 
18
 
 
Furthermore, through time, mostly forms-based approach of the Commission has 
become insufficient for some cases.
19
 For instance, in Michelin II decision in 2001,
20
 
the Commission stated that Michelin abused its dominant position by practicing loyalty 
rebates. This decision was heavily criticized because of its forms-based approach. Some 
scholars argue that if the Commission had adopted an effects-based approach, the 
outcome of decision would not find the practices abusive.
21
 The other example can be 
                                                 
16
 ―Competition: Annual report shows how competition policy helps unlock potential of 
EU Single Market‖ 
―EU Competition Policy‖, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-472_en.htm, 
http://europedia.moussis.eu/books/Book_2/5/15/, 
Speech of Neelie Kroes, ―Competition policy as a promoter of the Single Market‖,  
http://www.google.com.tr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDk
QFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Feuropa.eu%2Frapid%2Fpress-release_SPEECH-06-
245_en.pdf&ei=cF0GUsm4GobFtAap7oGoCg&usg=AFQjCNHsikFBq8xfy4LW74up5
0o72O5U9g&sig2=THnC0Zdlv2_LvfyPzRAbDA&bvm=bv.50500085,d.Yms 
17
Lowe, Philip, op. cit. 
18
 Ordoliberalism defined as ―an ideology dedicated to achieving a competitive order 
that is able to control private economic and political power in order to ensure a 
properous and humane society, which quarantees individual economic freedom and 
price stability‖ (p. 881), Marsden and Gormsen says that protecting the competitive 
structure together with competitors rather than the competition‘s actual results goes 
back to Ordoliberal thought (p.882) See Philip Marsden and Liza Lovdahl 
Gormsen,―Guidance on abuse in Europe: The continued concern for rivalry and 
competitve structure‖, The Anti Trust Bulletin, Vol.55, No.4/Winter 2010, pp. 875-914 
for further information. 
19
 Pınar Akman, ―AB Komisyonu 102. Madde Kılavızu Işığında Hakim Durumun 
Kötüye Kullanılması Reformuna Dair Eleştiriler ve Öneriler‖, Hakim Durumun Kötüye 
Kullanılması: Sorunlar ve Çözüm Önerileri, edt. Kerem Cem Sanlı, (On İki Levha 
Yayınları:İstanbul, 2010), pp. 69-91, p. 70, Lowe, Philip, op.cit. 
20
 Case T-203/01, Michelin v. Commission, 20 June 2001 
21
 See  Massimo Motta, Michelin II-The treatment of rebates in Cases in European 
Competition Policy-The Economic Analysis edt. Bruce Lyons, p.29-49, Denis 
Waelbroeck, The Assessment of Efficiencies under Article 102 and the Commission‘s 
Guidance Paper, p. 2 
 8 
 
the British Airways Case.
22
 The CJEU argued that proof of consumer harm is not 
necessary for the evaluation of abuse of the dominant position. It means the CJEU did 
not require analyzing anti-competitive effects on consumers. The CJEU made the same 
argument in Continental Can Case in 1973.
23
 This decision was found formalistic and 
suggests a much more economic analysis.
24
 As the examples show, the economic 
analysis was missing even in some significant cases mentioned above.  
 
The other criticism about Article 102 focuses on its ambiguous nature that stems 
from the forms-based approach of the Commission. According to Art and Colomo, 
Article is not clear and coherent ―both internally and in relation to other provisions of 
EU competition law‖. 25 As Akman states the criteria of ‗abusiveness‘ and the standard 
of harm are not clearly stated. Businesses cannot be sure if their practices are abusive or 
not at the first glance. This lack of clarity leads to uncertainties of how and when to 
apply. Because of this problem of its implementation and interpretation, one could say 
that the application of Article becomes less legitimate. Indeed, the clarity of Article 102 
is important not only for the businesses but also for member states and candidates like 
Turkey which take EU Competition Law as a model
26
 as a member of Customs Union.
27
  
 
Thus, considering all these points related to Article 102, the Commission 
initiated a review process. To clarify Article 102 by adopting an effects-based approach, 
it published DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the 
Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses in 2005. This was the second source; but the first 
towards the Guidance. 
 
                                                 
22
 Case T-219/99  P British Airways v. Commission [2003]. 
23
 Case C-6/72 Continental Can v. Commission Case [1973]. 
24
 Ariel Ezrachi, EU Competition Law, (Hart Publishing:Oxford, 2012), p. 88. 
25
 Jean-Yves Art and Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, ―Judicial Review in Article 102 TFEU, 
2005, p. 16-17. http://www.intertic.org/BookPapers/Art.pdf 
26
 Pınar Akman, ―AB Komisyonu 102. Madde Kılavızu Işığında Hakim Durumun 
Kötüye Kullanılması Reformuna Dair Eleştiriler ve Öneriler‖, Hakim Durumun Kötüye 
Kullanılması: Sorunlar ve Çözüm Önerileri, edt. Kerem Cem Sanlı, (On İki Levha 
Yayınları: İstanbul, 2010), pp. 69-91, p. 70. 
27―AB ile İlişkiler,‖ 
 http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/default.aspx?nsw=EE+M7vEMd61mHuetzOK/MQ==-
H7deC+LxBI8= 
 9 
 
1.2.Discussion Paper of 2005:
28
 
 
The Discussion Paper is not guidance for the enforcement priorities of Article 82, 
but a revealing of possible principles which could be transformed into a guideline 
later
29
. It presents market definition, dominance, framework for analysis of exclusionary 
abuses, exclusionary practices and possible defenses meaning objective justifications 
and efficiencies in a detailed way. The Paper enlists these exclusionary practices as 
predatory pricing, single branding and rebates, tying and bundling and refusal to supply. 
The paper aims to have to economic analysis and a more effects-based approach when 
enforcing Article 82. In order to make economic analysis as efficient competitor test 
was introduced for price-based practices as the fundamental tool for understanding 
abusive practices. Within the context of effects-based approach, whether an anti-
competitive practice causes consumer harm or not was emphasized. In fact, the 
Commission states that the objective of Article 82 is to enhance consumer welfare and 
ensure efficient allocation of resources.
30
 Besides, the paper states that efficiencies 
should be also taken into account for deciding whether a practice is abusive or not. To 
clarify, if there are efficiencies that outweigh anti-competitive effects, these practices 
may be not abusive.
31
  
 
The actual aim of the Discussion Paper is literally ―to discuss‖. Therefore, the 
Commission asked for comments on its website and received more than one hundred 
comments in return. It also organized a public hearing and a public debate on in June 
2006 participated by scholars and experts in the field including Elhauge, Neven and 
Geradin. Then, the Commission evaluated the comments and all the findings of debate. 
More than three years later, based on the debates, the Guidance was published by the 
Commission in December 2008.
32
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1.3. An Overview of the Guidance: 
 
The Guidance is not a statement of law, but the enforcement priorities of the DG 
Competition. It does not bind the European Courts, the National Competition 
Authorities and Member State Courts. However, these institutions are expected to use it 
as a framework for their enforcement of Article 82.
33
 The Guidance was designed to 
have a more effects-based approach in the implementation of Article 82. The 
Commission argued that the Guidance ―provided a comprehensive guidance to business 
community and competition law enforcers at national level on how the Commission 
uses an economic and effects-based approach to establish its enforcement priorities 
under Article 102 TFEU in relation to exclusionary conduct‖34 in order to ―provide 
greater clarity and predictability‖ as a ―general framework‖.35 
 
The main focus of the Guidance is the protection of consumer welfare. The 
Commission states that dominant firms have ―special responsibility‖ to ―compete on 
merits‖ and not to infringe Article 82. The effective enforcement of Article 82 helps 
markets and it is beneficial for businesses, consumers and integrated internal market. 
36
 
The Guidance states that there are two forms of abuse of the dominant position; 
exploitative and exclusionary conducts. What the Guidance solely takes into account is 
the exclusionary practices of the single dominant firms.
37
  
 
Then, the Guidance presents a general approach to exclusionary conduct. It 
states that the first step in the assessment of dominant position is the degree of market 
power.
38
 Here, the dominance is defined as position of the economic strength of an 
undertaking that can use this to prevent effective competition and behave independently 
                                                 
33
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from competitors, customers and consumers.
39
 The Commission argues that an 
undertaking which can increase prices profitably in a significant period of time can be 
regarded as a dominant power.
40
 
 
The assessment of dominance firstly includes the market position of the 
dominant undertaking, entry of potential competitors and countervailing buyer power.
41
 
For the market position; the Commission states that the lower market shares are good 
proxy for the absence of substantial market power. The dominance is not likely to be 
under 40 % of market share. Also, holding the higher the market share for a longer the 
period of time can be a preliminary sign of the existence of dominant position.
42
 
Secondly, the assessment looks at entry and expansion barriers. Actual or potential 
competitors can deter a company from raising prices if expansion or entry would be 
likely, timely and sufficient. Here, barriers to entry can include not only legal barriers, 
but also advantages of the dominant company; such as economies of scale and scope; 
privileged access to essential inputs, resources, or technologies; or an established 
distribution or sales network, even where these barriers are created by the company with 
the investments or long-term customer contracts that have appreciable foreclosure 
effects.
43
 Thirdly, competitive constraints can be exercised by the consumers if the 
bargaining powers of the consumers are high. This may deter an attempt by the 
undertaking to profitably increase prices.
44
  
 
In the next part, the Guidance explains foreclosure leading consumer harm as 
anti-competitive foreclosure. The Guidance used the term to define a situation where 
effective access of actual or potential competitors  to market is eliminated as a result of  
the conduct of the dominant undertaking is likely to be in a position to profitably 
increase the price to detriment of consumers.
45
       
The relevant factors for anti-competitive foreclosure are: the position of the 
dominant undertaking, the conditions on the relevant market, the position of the 
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dominant undertaking‘s competitors, the position of the customers and input suppliers, 
the extent of the allegedly abusive conduct, possible evidence of actual foreclosure and 
direct evidence of any exclusionary strategy.
46
 
For a price-based exclusionary conduct, the Commission makes as efficient 
competitor test and uses economic data of cost and sales prices and looks at whether the 
dominant undertaking charges prices below cost.
47
 This means the main focus of the 
exclusionary practices is the elimination of efficient competitor. However, the Guidance 
states that in some cases less efficient competitors can be taken into account for anti-
competitive foreclosure.
48
 There are certain cost benchmarks for this test; average 
avoidable cost (AAC)
49
 and long-run average incremental cost (LRAIC).
50
 If an 
undertaking cannot cover AAC, it sacrifices profits. As a result, an equally efficient 
competitor cannot get consumers without making loss. LRAIC is usually above AAC 
and it consists includes product specific fixed costs that were made before the abusive 
conduct. The failing to cover LRAIC for dominant undertaking means that it cannot 
recover fixed costs of producing goods or service. This may lead to foreclosure of an 
equally efficient competitor from the market.
51
 In addition, Guidance states to apply the 
cost benchmarks also it is necessary look at revenues and costs of the dominant 
company and its competitors. It may be not enough to assess whether the price or 
revenue covers the costs for the production in question but it may be necessary to look 
at the incremental revenues of the competitors if they affected the competitors‘ 
negatively. For two-sided markets it can be necessary to look at the revenues and the 
costs of both dominant firm and its competitors at the same time.
52
  
The next point that the Guidance deals with is objective necessity and 
efficiencies. It states that the dominant undertaking can show if its conduct is 
objectively necessary, indispensable or if it creates efficiencies that outweigh anti-
                                                 
46
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competitive effects on consumers and that can justify the abusive practice. Health and 
safety reasons can be considered as an example to objective necessity for an 
exclusionary conduct. The efficiencies are the following: -the efficiencies have been 
realized as a result of the conduct such as technical improvements, in quality of goods 
or reduction in cost of production, -the conduct becomes indispensable if there are no 
less anti-competitive alternatives to the conduct that are capable of producing the same 
efficiencies, -the likely efficiencies brought about the conduct that outweigh any 
negative effects on competition and consumer welfare, -the conduct does not eliminate 
effective competition by removing all or most existing resources of actual or potential 
competition, where there is no competition or no threat of entry, competitive process 
outweighs possible efficiency gains
53
.  
 
In the next part, the Guidance lists the specific forms of abuse and when the 
Commission can intervene them. These are exclusive dealing, tying and bundling, 
predation, refusal to supply and margin squeeze. 
 
1. Exclusive dealing 
 
The Guidance defines exclusive dealing as the practices that a dominant undertaking 
forecloses its competitors by preventing them from selling to customers. The 
Commission divides the exclusive dealing practices into two:
54
 
 
 
 
a. Exclusive purchasing 
 
The Guidance states that an exclusive purchasing obligation is an agreement 
between the undertaking and consumer that requires consumer to purchase largely or 
exclusively only from the undertaking. The dominant undertaking may have to 
compensate the customers if they have loss because of the exclusive purchasing. This 
                                                 
53
 ibid., paras 28-31. 
54
 ibid., para 32. 
 14 
 
situation can prevent the entry and expansion of the competitors and then the 
Commission will intervene.
55
  
 
The anti-competitive foreclosure of exclusive purchasing obligations takes place if: 
- competitors are not able to compete for the demand of the individual customers 
since the dominant undertaking is unavoidable trading partner or the brand of 
the dominant undertaking is a must-stock item. 
- the duration of the obligation is long since longer duration has greater possibility 
to foreclose the market.
56
 
 
b. Conditional Rebates: 
 
The Guidance defines conditional rebates as granted rewards to customers for a 
particular form of purchasing behavior in cases in which they exceeded a certain 
threshold. The rebates given for all purchases are called retroactive rebates. If the 
rebates is only on those made in excess of those required to achieve the threshold it is 
called as incremental rebates. The aim of the conditional rebates is to increase demand. 
However, those rebates have actual and potential effects that are similar those of 
exclusive purchasing obligations. The dominant undertaking does not have to make 
sacrifice for those effects to occur.
57
 
 
The Commission indicates that the likelihood of anti-competitive foreclosure is 
higher, if the competitors cannot compete on the each individual customer‘s entire 
demand. The Guidance says that where competitors cannot compete customer‘s entire 
demand, a dominant firm can use the non-contestable part of the demand as a leverage 
to decrease prices in the contestable part of the demand.
58
 
 
The Guidance says that the retroactive rebates can foreclose the market 
significantly. If there is higher rebate as a percentage of the total price, higher threshold 
and greater inducement below the threshold, the possibility of foreclosure of actual or 
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potential competitors increases.
59
 To understand whether the rebate scheme is capable 
of preventing entry and expansion of the equally efficient competitors, the Commission 
proposes effective price test. Here effective price is the price that competitor has to 
match the loss of the costumer from switching to the conditional rebate of dominant 
undertaking but the normal (list) price less the rebate the customer losses by switching, 
calculated over the relevant range of sales and in the relevant period of time.
60
 The 
effective price is at least as high as the LRAIC of the dominant undertaking.
61
 For the 
calculation of the effective price, if the rebate is incremental the incremental purchases 
are taken into account. For the retroactive rebates, it is relevant to look at how much of 
a customer‘s demand can be switched to a competitor, which is the contestable share of 
the market. If the customers can switch of large amounts quickly to competitors, means 
that the relevant range is large.
62
 In addition, the lower effective price than the average 
price of the dominant undertaking means that there is higher loyalty inducing effect. On 
the other hand, if the effective price is higher than LRAIC, the rebate does not create 
anti-competitive foreclosure effect. Where the effective price is below AAC, it can 
create foreclosing effect even for equally efficient competitors. Moreover, if the 
effective price is between AAC and LRAIC, the Commission will look at the other 
factors such as the realistic and effective counterstrategies of the competitors.
63
 
The Guidance also indicates that rebates with individualized threshold can create 
more loyalty inducing effect than that of the standardized threshold. The dominant 
undertakings may defend that their rebates create benefits to customers. The cost related 
efficiencies are more likely to be seen in standardized volume targets than in 
individualized volume targets. Then the Commission considers claims by dominant 
undertakings which say that the rebates systems achieve cost or other advantages to 
customers. The cost advantages are more likely to have with standardized volume 
targets than with individualized volume targets. In the same vein, incremental rebate 
schemes are more likely to give incentives to resellers to sell more units than retroactive 
rebates
64
.  
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2. Predation 
 
The Guidance intervene the cases if the undertakings engage in predatory 
pricing, deliberately sacrifice their profits and likely to have anti-competitive 
foreclosure that can foreclose actual or potential competitors and harm the consumers.
65
 
In the analysis of the predation what the Guidance analyzes are sacrifice, existence of 
anti-competitive foreclosure, and efficiencies. 
 
 According to the Guidance, sacrifice is the practice of selling at lower prices 
that lead to losses in a short period of time. The pricing below AAC is seen as a clear 
indication of sacrifice in most cases. In addition, the Commission may also investigate 
short term net revenues lower than expected from a reasonable alternative practice. The 
predatory strategy can also be shown with direct evidences, such as detailed plans of 
sacrifice to exclude a competitor, to prevent the entry or to pre-empt the emergence of a 
market or evidence of concrete threats of predation.
66
  
 
For the anti-competitive foreclosure, the Guidance requires to make equally 
efficient competitor analysis in which pricing below LRAIC can have foreclosure 
effect. In addition, the Guidance argues that, if the dominant undertaking is informed 
about the cost of the rivals, has reputation about predatory pricing, can distort market 
signals about the profitability, it may engage in predatory conduct. Moreover, it is easier 
for the dominant undertaking to engage in predatory conduct if it selectively targets 
customers with low prices, and so this limits the loss incurred by the dominant 
undertaking. Charging low prices for a long period of time is less likely to produce 
predation.
67
 Additionally, Guidance argues that no need to look at the recoupment of 
losses for the analysis of the predatory pricing.
68
 On the efficiencies, the Guidance 
argues that it is unlikely for predatory pricing to create efficiencies but the Commission 
will consider the claims related to economies of scale and expand the market.
69
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The Commission does not find it necessary to demonstrate that the competitors 
have exited the market to show there has been an anti-competitive foreclosure. There is 
also the possibility that the dominant undertaking may prefer to hinder the competitor 
from competing in a vigorous way. It can also make the competitor follow the pricing 
strategy of the dominant undertaking rather than eliminating the competitor from the 
market. This kind of disciplining avoids elimination of competition, but it creates the 
risk of low cost entrants and the sale of the assets of the competitors at lower prices. 
70
 
 
Furthermore, the Guidance states that identifying consumer harm is not a 
mechanical calculation of profits and losses. The proof of overall profits is not required. 
Likely consumer harm may be shown by assessing likely foreclosure effect of the 
conduct, together with the other factors like entry barriers.
71
 
 
3. Refusal to supply and Margin Squeeze 
 
The Guidance declares that refusal to supply and margin squeeze usually arise 
when the dominant undertaking competes downstream market and refuses to give input 
to the manufacturers that they need for manufacturing products or providing services.
72
 
This means refusal to supply and margin squeeze occur if the dominant undertaking is 
vertically integrated. 
 
The Commission does not view it relevant for the refused product to have been 
traded before. Similarly, an actual refusal by the dominant undertaking is not required. 
Constructive refusals such as unduly delaying, reducing the supply of the product and 
imposition of unreasonable conditions are sufficient for the assessment of refusal to 
supply.
73
 
 
Margin squeeze occurs when a dominant undertaking changes a price for the 
product on the upstream market and does not allow even an equally efficient competitor 
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to make profits in downstream market. The cost benchmark is stated as LRAIC of the 
downstream part of the vertically integrated dominant undertaking.
74
 
  
The Commission regards the following priorities as for the input in refusal to 
supply and margin squeeze cases: 
 
-objective necessity: An input is considered objectively necessary if there is no 
actual or potential substitute that competitors can use in downstream market at least in 
the long term. At that point, the Commission does not take into account if the product 
that is not supplied has been supplied before. However, if the input was previously 
supplied and the buyer made investments to use that input, the Commission can regard 
this input as indispensable. Likewise since it was in the interest of the owner of the 
input to supply the essential input, it does not show that owner receives inadequate 
compensation for the original investment. Thus, it is up to dominant firm to explain why 
the circumstances have changed and makes it not to supply.
75
 
 
-elimination of effective competition in downstream market: The Commission 
argues that high market share of the dominant undertaking in the downstream market 
indicates greater possibility for elimination of effective competition. Moreover, if there 
is closer substitutability of the products between the competitors in downstream market 
and if the dominant undertaking is less capacity-constrained than the competitors in the 
downstream market, more competitors will be affected from the practice.
76
 
 
-consumer harm: The Commission states that consumer harm happens if the 
refusal is ―prevented from bringing innovative goods or services to the market and/or 
where follow-on innovation is likely to be stifled.‖77 Besides, if the price in upstream 
market is regulated whereas the price in the downstream market is not regulated and if 
the dominant undertaking excludes the competitors on the downstream market through a 
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refusal to supply, consumers are harmed and upstream undertaking can get more 
profits.
78
  
 
Finally, the Guidance states that there can be efficiency arguments for refusal to 
supply cases. For example a refusal to supply may be necessary to allow the dominant 
undertaking to realize an adequate return on the investments required to develop its 
input business. It may also be necessary if the dominant undertaking‘s innovation will 
be affected negatively by the obligation to supply. Here, it is dominant undertaking‘s 
burden to show the negative impact. These claims are relevant efficiency grounds for 
refusal to supply for cases in which the dominant firm has previously supplied the 
input.
79
 
 
1.4. An Analysis of the Guidance: 
 
The Guidance includes topics less than expected.
80
 For example, it does not 
include exploitative abuses and collective dominance. Also, it does not have some 
topics that exist in the Discussion Paper such as unconditional rebates. Furthermore, 
refusal to license intellectual property rights and refusal to supply information needed 
for interoperability are analyzed as separate forms of abuse in the Discussion Paper.
81
 
Whereas in the Guidance Paper, there are no separate headings for these practices but 
they are under the refusal to supply and objective necessity of input cases.
82
 The 
Discussion Paper and the Guidance both emphasize the economic assessment, effect-
based approach and consumer welfare. 
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The cases that the Guidance deals with are all exclusionary practices, exclusive 
dealing; exclusive purchasing and conditional rebates, tying and bundling, predation, 
refusal to supply and margins squeeze. However, just having exclusionary practices is 
not enough. For instance, Akman thinks that it would be a better clarification of the 
enforcement priorities of Article 82, if the Guidance included the exploitative forms of 
abuse.
83
 This means, for a much more comprehensive analysis for the abuse of 
dominant position, exploitative practices should be taken into account as well. 
 
In relation to that, what I find interesting is that the Commission reconciles 
exclusion of the rivals with consumer harm. My point here is that since the aim of an 
exclusionary practice is to exclude a rival from the market, it does not seem directly 
related to consumer harm. However if one pushes what the Guidance states, can reach 
to this conclusion: as efficient competitor test protects effective competitive process, 
which at the end leads to innovation, decreasing costs and decreasing prices. This 
situation ideally increases consumer welfare. The Commission may have this idea in the 
background although the Guidance does not state this directly. Therefore, consumer 
harm and exclusion of rivals are all indirectly related. Besides, there should be better 
ways to establish much more concrete and direct links. At that point, an analysis of 
exploitative abuses occupies an essential place. If the Guidance had included these other 
practices, it would become a much more thorough document presenting more directly 
related links between consumer harm and abusive practices. 
 
The Guidance‘s emphasis on consumer welfare is criticized by some scholars. 
One of these scholars is Chiriţă who claims that there are consumer protection laws and 
regulations that are more inclusive in the EU law. Therefore, what the Guidance is 
doing is particularly unnecessary. Besides, she states that the efficiency-based health 
and safety reasons in paragraph 29 of the Guidance must not the concerns of EU 
competition law.
84
 Thus one can say that the Commission spends too much time on 
consumer welfare. I believe this may be a strategy to overemphasize the effects-based 
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approach adopted in the Guidance, but this is of course debatable, hard to explain and 
needs a much more sophisticated analysis.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the Guidance can bring legal certainty to 
Article 102. It can also help the businesses to analyze their behaviors by showing 
whether they are infringements for Article 102 or not. Also, countries like Turkey can 
use the Guidance as a model for their competition policies. On the other hand Whish 
argues that the Guidance has more lenient or less interventionist approach than Article 
102. This may give birth to legal uncertainty. For example it may lead to tensions and 
inconsistencies between the Court and the Commission as it happened in Telia Soneria 
case in which the approach of the CJEU was stricter than the evaluation of the margin 
squeeze of the Commission.
85
 
 
As for the content, it can be seen that the Guidance aimed at more economic 
analysis and therefore it includes many tests and calculations. For example, there are 
calculations of effective price, as efficient competitor test, actual and likely effects, the 
efficiencies and objective necessity. This situation can be considered as a sign of the 
presence of more effects-based approach than before. However, the extent to which 
these tests and calculations are effects-based rather than forms-based is also debatable. 
 
Firstly, for a firm to be a dominant undertaking, the market share alone is not a 
sufficient indicator as it is stated in the Guidance. The duration of the market power and 
the ability to control prices are the other important factors which should be taken into 
account. The duration of the market power is stated as two years in the Guidance.
86
 
Motta argues that the duration in the Guidance is rather short and can be 5-10 years 
depending on the firm to indicate dominance.
87
 Actually, this point made by the 
Commission is an example of forms-based approach, since it fails to consider market-
specific and firm-specific conditions. The Guidance states that the dominance comes 
from being able to increase prices profitably than the competitive level. However it is 
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not that easy to calculate the competitive price since the end result of calculation will 
become hypothetical in any case.
88
 
 
For market share, the Guidance states that the dominant undertakings whose 
market share is less than 40 % are less likely to be dominant. This clear and certain 
declaration of the market share excludes undertakings with market shares between 35-
40 %. This is an effects-based approach
89
 since economic analysis was made to 
calculate market share. However, the Commission is not saying that they will not be 
investigating those undertakings with market share less than 40 % for abusive conduct 
according to Motta. Therefore, there emerges a new uncertainty since the Commission 
takes the burden of proving the dominance of the firm that has less than 40 % market 
share and uses its scarce resources for additional investigations. As Motta states, the 
Discussion Paper mentions 25 % threshold for dominance whereas the Commission 
increased it in the Guidance. This is a positive development
90
 since it contributes to 
competition. Furthermore, the Guidance states that having high market share and 
spending long period of time in the market with substantial market share can be a more 
likely cause of the abuse of the dominance. This situation may require the Commission 
to intervene the practices of the dominant undertaking just by looking at the market 
share without looking at the actual effects of the abusive practice.
91
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For the anti-competitive foreclosure part, the Commission argues that it aims not 
to exclude the efficient competitors. However it does not count all exclusions as anti-
competitive. An anti-competitive foreclosure can be the result of the actual or likely 
effects of the consumer harm and at the same time it could be the expected result of the 
exclusion of the competitors. This situation brings uncertainty since the Guidance does 
not explain the relationship between exclusion of rivals and consumer harm in a clear 
and distinct way. By doing this, the Commission might have wanted to open up a space 
for itself for the assessment of the cases, so that it could gain more flexibility as Akman 
claims
92
. Here, why the Commission needs that space deserves further analysis which is 
not in the scope of this thesis. 
 
In the Guidance, the Commission does not require a detailed assessment before 
concluding that the conduct is likely to result in consumer harm. Within that context, if 
a practice does not create efficiencies, it can be counted as anti-competitive. This 
approach here is problematic because it may lead to infer an undertaking as anti-
competitive because it was not efficient. Here, the Guidance does not take consumer 
welfare into account. This becomes a forms-based approach rather than an effects-based 
one at the end unlike the Guidance states for itself.
93
 
Moreover, the Guidance defines as efficient competitor test which aims to find 
out the LRAIC and AAC as a general test for the price-based anti-competitive practices. 
As the result of this test, prices below cost are punished.
94
 Three points should be 
addressed here. First of all, it is hard to calculate prices and sometimes the practices 
with prices below cost can be beneficial for consumers.
95
 Secondly, the Guidance states 
that if the Commission does not find information from the dominant undertaking 
reliable, it can use the cost data of the other competing firms.
96
 This is also controversial 
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and debatable in terms of legitimacy and legal certainty of the Commission.
97
 The third 
point is that sometimes less efficient competitors can be protected according to the 
Guidance.
98
 However the Guidance does not clarify under which circumstances, it is 
necessary to protect the less efficient competitors. Therefore, one can say that the 
Guidance again adopts a forms-based approach.  
 
Furthermore, in the Guidance there is nothing directly stated about the intent of 
predatory pricing. However, it states sacrifice can be understood from the documents 
that show predatory strategy.
99
 Therefore one can say that documentary evidence can be 
used as proof of sacrifice instead of the economic calculations such as cost/price 
analysis. Rosenblatt et. al., argue that this method is the same with the idea of ―showing 
anti-competitive object and anti-competitive effect‖ sometimes as the same100. They 
also interpret this idea as a proof of intent which is relevant but not required for 
evaluating all predatory pricing cases. Besides, in the Guidance it is hard to find 
anything related to the recoupment of losses. It just states that showing calculations of 
profits and losses and proof of overall profits are not required. For a further explanation, 
the reader should read  footnotes. In footnote 6 for paragraph 71, the Wanadoo and 
Tetra Pak II cases in which the CJEU states that the proof of actual recoupment was not 
required are mentioned.
101
 Rosenblatt et. al., find the  Commission‘s evaluation about 
recoupment ambiguous since the Guidance Paper states that the Commission does not 
need to intervene if the dominant undertaking is likely to involve in recoupment, that is 
to increase its prices at exploitative levels after the predation period. What the 
Commission needs to show is that the conduct would be likely to prevent or delay a 
decline in prices that would otherwise have occurred.‖102 
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According to the Guidance, in case of a refusal to supply of an objectively 
necessary input if there are efficiencies that outweigh the negative effects of the 
practice, there may not emerge an anti-competitive foreclosure. For this case, the burden 
of proof is on the dominant undertaking.
103
 Here Motta argues that the burden to prove 
efficiencies should not be on the defendant, but should be on the Commission.
104
 
 
As the last point, it is true that the Guidance provides a much more effects-based 
approach and economic analysis then before, although it may have forms-based sides. 
Here to what extent the Commission makes its decisions depending on the Guidance is 
very important. If it is not applied by the Commission, inconsistencies between the 
case-law and the Guidance may arise. 
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CHAPTER 2: RECENT EU DECISIONS BETWEEN 2009-2013 ON 
EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT  
 
2.1. EU Decisions on Predatory Pricing: 
2.1.1. Post Danmark Decision:
105
 
 
Post Danmark is an undertaking in unaddressed mail sector such as brochures, 
telephone directories, guides, local and regional newspapers in Denmark. Although the 
postal sector was liberalized in Denmark, Post Danmark was the monopoly in the 
delivery of addressed letters and parcels not exceeding a certain level of weight and it 
owned universal service obligation to deliver addressed mails in Denmark from 2003 to 
2004. 
 
The other firm active in unaddressed mail market is Forbruger-Kontakt (FK). FK 
complained Post Denmark to Konkurrencerådet, Danish Competition Council, by 
arguing that it abused its dominant position by making price discrimination and 
predatory pricing. According to allegations, there were three supermarket customers; 
the SuperBest, Spar and Coop. They were consumers of FK but later Post Danmark 
made contracts with them for very low and different prices. The prices to the SuperBest 
and Spar were higher than ATC. However, the prices that were imposed on Coop were 
below average incremental costs (AIC), but below average total costs (ATC). At the 
end, Konkurrencerådet fined Post Denmark for price discrimination but not for 
predatory pricing. Later, Post Denmark went on appeal to the Danish Competition 
Appeals Tribunal, Konkurrenceankenævnet, which upheld the decision that there was 
price discrimination and no proof for predatory pricing. Then, Post Danmark brought an 
appeal to Ǿstre Landsret, Eastern Regional Court. Here again it was accepted that there 
was abuse of dominant position. After that, Post Danmark appealed to Højesteret, the 
Supreme Court of Denmark. Since there were no documents found that show the intent 
of the pricing practices made by Post Danmark, Højesteret asked the CJEU questions 
for preliminary ruling. The first question was asking if a price lower than ATC but 
higher than AIC could be taken into account as an exclusionary abuse. Secondly, under 
what circumstances the national court decides on exclusionary abuse. 
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For answering those questions CJEU looked at the prices of Post Danmark and 
also mentioned AKZO decision.
106
 In AKZO decision, there was Areeda Turner Test, 
which suggests that for an undertaking, price below AVC is abusive, price between 
AVC and ATC can be abusive if it is proved that the practice is part of a plan to 
eliminate competition and price above ATC is considered as not anti-competitive. In 
Post Danmark case, there was no proof of intent to eliminate competition. For 
application of this test to Post Danmark, CJEU argued that AIC and ATC were 
appropriate cost benchmarks. As Advocate General suggested in his Opinion, 
incremental costs can be better benchmarks than the variable costs for an undertaking 
entrusted with a task of general economic interest that is universal service since Post 
Danmark already had the distribution network for universal postal services.
107
 Then, 
since the prices to the SuperBest and Spar were higher than ATC, CJEU concluded that 
there were no anti-competitive effects. The prices that were imposed on Coop were 
above AIC, but below ATC. Therefore, the national court must make as efficient 
competitor test and look at the effects of the practice.  
 
Thus, CJEU concluded it had objective justifications for the pricing policies 
made by Post Danmark. Therefore, CJEU answered the above-mentioned questions by 
stating that a pricing policy below ATC but above AIC is not enough to understand 
whether the practice is exclusionary or not. The national court must look at the actual 
and likely effects of the practice and if there are objective justifications for the practice 
such as efficiency gains or economies of scale or not.  
 
Additionally, Advocate General Mengozzi, considered the possibility of cross-
subsidization since Post Danmark has dominant position in the addressed mail services 
and has networks in the addressed mail delivery that it used in the unaddressed mail 
delivery services. He offered a stand alone cost test to evaluate effects of cross 
subsidization. However, the situation of the ―common distribution network resources‖ 
considered by Mengozzi as a source of economies of scale between unaddressed and 
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addressed mail services. Here there could be efficiency gains which did not eliminate 
the competition and not harm consumer welfare.
108
 
 
The decision of the court was interpreted as an effects-based decision. Rousseva 
and Marquis argue that Post Danmark decision is in line with the effects-based approach 
and the Guidance. This situation increased the legal certainty.
109
  There are four reasons 
for this. Firstly, as it happens in AKZO case, the Guidance suggests cost benchmarks 
defined as AAC and LRAIC. The prices below AAC
110
 were counted as anti-
competitive since these prices could be indication of sacrifice of profits and so eliminate 
as efficient competitor. The reason is that an equally efficient competitor cannot serve 
the targeted consumers without incurring a loss.
111
 Also, it is not possible to say that 
pricing above LRAIC can exclude efficient competitors. For Post Danmark case, AIC is 
more suitable than AVC since the industry is characterized by high fixed costs and very 
low variable costs.
112
 In addition to that, LRAIC is equal to ATC for single product 
undertakings.
113
 As a result, the cost benchmarks are consistent with the Guidance. 
Secondly, in the Post Danmark decision it is stated that for the prices between AIC and 
ATC, the national court must look at the effects. Because it is not enough to look at cost 
concepts and/or the intent for understanding if there exists predatory pricing or not in 
such cases. Thirdly, the decision emphasized competition on merits and explained that 
not every exclusionary effect is detrimental to competition. For example, if an effect 
causes the exit of less efficient competitors as it is the case in the Guidance, it does not 
become exclusionary. Lastly, for the assessment of anti-competitive effects; efficiency 
gains, consumer welfare concepts and the objective justification must be taken into 
account to decide on predatory pricing.  
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On the other hand, Barazza argues that although Post Danmark took effects 
rather than the intent for the case when the prices are between AIC and ATC and in that 
sense it presents a different standard than that in the AKZO decision. In forms-based 
approach, if the price is between AVC and ATC, intent is examined. The effects-based 
approach however considers the LRAIC. If the price is between LRAIC and AAC, then 
for effects-based analysis, the effects are analyzed. Rousseva and Marquis argue that the 
intent and effects can be the same in some cases. The reason for this similarity is that if 
there is an abusive intent, its effect will be probably abusive as well. Although it is 
debatable, there seems to be a relation between effects and intent, but it will be wrong to 
say that these are always directly linked to one another. Thus, sometimes the proof of 
anti-competitive effects can be the same with the proof of anti-competitive intent.
114
 In 
addition, Krah and Bien believe that, with Post Danmark decision, CJEU closed a legal 
gap for understanding if the prices above ATC were anti-competitive or not. This 
situation however gave birth to another legal gap. The decision did not say anything 
about the prices between ATC and AIC in a clear way. These prices are not per se 
abusive and there is no assumption that they create foreclosure effect.
115
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2.2. EU Decisions on Rebates
116
 
2.2.1. Tomra Decision:
117
 
 
Tomra is a group of firms originated from Norway. The main geographical area 
that it operated was Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Austria and Sweden. It collects 
used beverage containers that were called Reverse Vending Machines (RVMs). These 
machines identify beverage containers by using certain information such as barcode, 
and shape and as a result calculate the amount of deposit that will be repaid to the 
consumers.
118
 Prokent is another firm produces RVMs, operated in Germany until its 
bankruptcy. It made a complaint to the Commission and argued that Tomra made 
loyalty rebates and agreements that had the effect of exclusive dealing.  
 
In its analysis, the Commission calculated Tomra‘s market share in high ending 
and low ending machines and defined two different relevant markets as ―high ending 
RVMs‖ and ―low ending RVMs‖. High ending machines are bigger RVMs with bigger 
capacity that can be used in supermarkets. Low ending RVMs are smaller machines that 
can be used in canteens and schools. According to the Commission, Tomra had market 
share of 70 % before 1997 and that share increased to 95 % after 1997 in high ending 
RVMs.  
Then, the Commission calculated market shares of Tomra in all five countries.  
It was found out that the market shares were in between 60- 95 % in different countries 
from 1998 to 2002. Here, the market shares were calculated by the percentage of the 
number of units sold per year. The other suppliers‘ market shares were calculated as 
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well. So, the Commission concluded that Tomra has factual monopoly in the high 
RVMs market. 
 
The rebates by Tomra were exclusivity agreements, de facto exclusivity 
agreements and loyalty building rebates such as individualized quantity commitments 
and retroactive rebates. The Commission looked at the all 49 rebate schemes in all 5 
countries and found that there was no standard for the rebates and exclusivity 
agreements; they were different for the each customer and they were individualized. 
 
For the economic analysis, the Commission looked at the relation between the 
contestable and non-contestable markets and contestable volume proportions of the 
markets for each country. Then, the Commission found out that there was negative 
correlation between the changes in Tomra‘s market share and the size of foreclosed 
market. Apart from that, EC looked at the price that a competitor would have to offer to 
make the customers switch from Tomra to other companies for each country. It found 
that, competitors may need to offer very low and even negative prices to make Tomra‘s 
customers to switch to them. 
 
According to on-site investigations in Tomra decision, the Commission found 
internal documents and e-mails that show the intent of Tomra. The documents showed 
that Tomra made strategies related to exclusion of the small competitors from the 
market before they get bigger.  
 
Tomra made a defense with economic analysis. However, the Commission 
found its defense irrational and did not accept its economic analysis. According to the 
Commission the economic analysis made by Tomra was not based on assumptions of 
rationality and did not assume that aim of the firms is to maximize profits. Therefore the 
Commission found this approaches ill-founded and unnecessarily complex. 
 
For the effects-based approach, likely effects of the rebates schemes were 
shown. The analysis of the Commission included the contestable market shares and 
situation of the other competitors. The only part for the actual effects can be Repant 
from Norway and Eleiko from Sweden which had small market shares and exited 
market. Also, Prokent from Germany tried to enter market and got some market share 
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but it failed to sustain this market share due to the practices of the undertaking. Tomra 
made abusive conduct during the ―key years‖119; as a result firms could not enter and 
expand their positions in the market. The decision examined the likely and actual effects 
of the rebate scheme. Nevertheless, it did not use the concepts in the Guidance; the 
Commission did not examine the consumer harm, there was no as efficient competitor 
test, no calculation of LRAIC and below cost pricing tests, and no discussions related to 
efficiencies of rebates. The structure of the rebates and the exclusivity clauses were 
enough for the assessment of the Commission whether there is abuse of the dominant 
position. Thus, it can be said that Tomra decision of the Commision had a per se 
approach. 
 
As a result, Tomra was fined with EUR 24 million and appealed to the CJEU. In 
the pleas of Tomra, they argued that it is not an effects-based approach and did not 
confirm with the Guidance. This could be a reasonable plea, but CJEU said that the 
Guidance was made in 2009, but the decision of Commission was made in 2006. So, 
both CJEU and the Commission cannot consider the Guidance and the effects-based 
approach.
120
 At the end the fine was not reduced and it was accepted by the 
Commission as a severe infringement of Article 102. 
 
Subiotto QC et al. indicate that some observers hoped that CJEU use an effects-
based approach as presented in the Guidance. However the Commission‘s decision was 
given in 2006 whereas the Guidance was published in 2009.  Therefore the CJEU did 
not use the Guidance. As a result, although the decision by CJEU was given in 2012; it 
does not have an effects-based approach and did not comply with the Guidance. What 
CJEU used was a traditional forms-based approach and it confirmed the decision of the 
Commission.
121
 At that point, Bacthelor and Jebelli discuss that Tomra decision was the 
first case after the new economic approach of the Commission. Despite that it was far 
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from the perspective of the Guidance
122
. Thus, one could say that there is a significant 
divergence between CJEU and the Guidance in Tomra case.
123
 
 
In the available literature,
124
 Tomra case is interpreted as a disappointment, since 
the CJEU failed to make an effects-based analysis. There is only Madan who finds this 
case effects-based. She argues that it was an important case because of the reform of 
Article 82, the amount of the economic analysis it included and its compliance with the 
Discussion Paper. Moreover Madan tells that with Tomra decision, the Commission 
gave up the forms-based approach that it had in Michelin II
125
 and Hoffman La 
Roche
126
 cases. What the Commission adopted is an effects-based approach according 
to Madan. By looking at the changes in the market shares of Tomra and other firms 
during the practices and showing whether there were entry and exit to the market, the 
Commission leaves traditional forms-based analysis.
127
 I believe, in her article, she 
misses the point that the existence of likely effects and some economic analysis does 
not make a case effects-based. Besides, Madan uses Competition Policy Newsletter as 
her only reference. The newsletter is actually a summary of the case prepared by DG-
Competition experts. This means its aim is to outline main points of the case, not to 
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analyze them. Besides, since the authors are experts of the Commission what they wrote 
can be a little bit narrow. In fact, these experts do not declare that Tomra case is effects-
based; they just state that Tomra decision has economic analysis. This, again, does not 
mean the decision was effects-based.
128
  
 
2.2.2. Intel Decision
129
 
 
Intel is the producer of micro-chips and it operates all over the world. According 
to allegations of AMD, another micro-chip producer, Intel abused its dominant position 
in x86 Central processing Units (CPUs) by making rebates to computer manufacturers 
(Original Equipment manufacturers-OEMs). In addition, Intel made direct payments to 
OEMs, if they delay the launch of the x86 CPU computers by AMD.  
 
According to the Commission, x86 CPU is a key component for all computers. 
CPU production requires high technology and investments. Therefore x86 CPU market 
has barriers to entry due to high costs. Within that context, Intel had dominant position 
in x86 CPU market with 70 % market share in the early 2000s. AMD is the other 
company that operates in the x86 CPU market. Therefore, in the market, there are only 
two firms with substantial market shares, since most of the small producers exited the 
market after 2000s.  
 
The investigation of the Commission showed that, Intel made conditional rebates 
to OEMs. The condition was that OEMs purchase all or almost all of CPUs from Intel. 
The Commission inspected all rebates to the Dell, HP, NEC, Lenovo and Media Saturn 
Holding, and found out that Intel made different loyalty rebates arrangements that could 
cause the effect of exclusive dealing agreements. To clarify, Intel made hidden rebates; 
did not want to make written agreements, but instead made verbal commitments with 
the OEMs. There were other internal documents and e-mails that showed the 
conditional arrangements as well. Moreover, there were naked restrictions by Intel to 
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the OEMs. Intel made direct payments to the OEMs if they delayed the launch of the 
new AMD x86 CPU based computers. 
 
For the evaluation of the conditional rebates, EC made an as efficient competitor 
test, looked at the contestable market shares and found that an efficient competitor 
would have to offer prices lower than the AAC of Intel. In other words, the rebates 
scheme of Intel could foreclose the market and had exclusionary effects. In addition, the 
Commission argued that the rebates, exclusionary agreements and naked restrictions 
harm competition and limit consumer choices since Intel restricted the 
commercialization of the AMD products and reduced the demand of x86 CPUs from the 
other manufacturers. The Commission argued that Intel sought to exclude AMD from 
the market. As a result, what Intel did was not competition on merits; it had negative 
impact on the competition and caused lower incentives to innovate for the firm. 
 
On the pleas, Intel argued that their practices caused efficiencies such as; lower 
prices, economies of scale, cost savings and product efficiencies. It declared that the 
practices had no effect in the market since AMD gained market share during the 
practice and the low market shares of AMD was its own failure since AMD did not 
offer as competitive and high quality as products like Intel. The Commission did not 
find those arguments valid, because AMD had improved its product offerings and 
besides, the documents from Intel showed that, Intel had started to see AMD as a 
―growing threat‖. In the end, the Commission decided that Intel abused its dominant 
position and now it had to a fine of EUR 1.06 billion that was highest fine given to a 
single undertaking until now.
130
 After that, Intel went to appeal to CJEU, but the case is 
not yet decided.
131
  
At the first sight, it looks like the Commission made an effects-based decision 
which is compatible with the Guidance. There were cost/price analysis with LRAIC, as 
efficient competitor test, calculation of the effective price and the contestable share of 
the market to see the effects on the rivals, likely effects on consumer welfare, 
efficiencies and objective justification. However Rousseva and Marquis argue that, Intel 
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decision was the first decision related to rebates after the publication of the Guidance. 
Since the inquiry of Intel was taking place during the adaption of the Guidance, the 
Commission argued that the document did not bind Intel. Despite that but the 
Commission voluntarily showed as efficient competitor analysis in the decision
132
. 
Geradin believes that the Commission did this to avoid criticism. He also argues that 
although the Commission spent a lot of time, energy and resources to Intel case
133
, there 
are many ―flaws‖ in the Intel decision. Firstly, the approach of the Commission had per 
se characteristic and the Commission proposed that it is not necessary for Commission 
to show the actual effects. Secondly, the Commission said that the Guidance paper will 
be used in future decisions. So the Intel case has a formalistic approach. Thirdly, the 
contestable share analysis of the Commission is wrong, since the Commission used the 
documents of the other firms but not the documents of Intel. This point, however, is 
debatable because the documents from the other firms cannot always trustable. The 
usage of the other firm‘s documents might have led to a legal uncertainty for the Intel 
case. In order to solve, legal uncertainty, Geradin
134
 and Arıtürk135 suggest cross-
examination methods. These alternative ways are important however they are not in the 
scope of this study. Also, the rebates are bargained with the OEMs so consumers have 
bargaining power and their welfare would not be effected. Lastly, if the rebates of the 
Intel have the capacity to exclude rivals from the market, it means that Intel‘s rebates 
limit the consumer choices and innovation. However, Geradin argues that AMD was 
still in the market, produce new products and can compete with Intel.
136
 
 
As a result, although the Intel decision had some deficits, it was still very 
significant for understanding the transition from forms-based approach to effects-based 
approach. It is because the Commission made as efficient competitor test, calculated the 
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contestable market shares and the effective price, the actual and likely effects on the 
consumers were analyzed and the decision becomes more compatible with the 
Guidance.
137
 
 
2.3. EU Decisions on Refusal to Supply:
138
 
2.3.1. Telekomunikacja Polska Decision:
139
 
 
Telekomunikacja Polska (TP) is a Polish telecommunications company. It was 
the state monopoly, but later liberalized. Then the sector was under the regulation of 
Polish regulator, despite that TP had the dominant position in the market. According to 
the Commission, the relevant markets for this case are the market for wholesale 
broadband access (bit stream access-BSA), the market for wholesale infrastructure 
access (local loop unbundling-LLU) and the retail mass market. The Commission 
argued that TP abused its dominant position in the Polish broadband access market by 
refusal to supply of giving access to its network and supply BSA and LLU wholesale 
products to alternative operators.  
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The Commission used the Guidance that whether TP met the conditions for 
refusal to supply and looked at the following points:  -the refusal relates to a product or 
service which is objectively necessary to be able to compete effectively on downstream 
market, -the refusal is likely to lead to the elimination of effective competition on the 
downstream market, and -the refusal leads to consumer harm.   
 
The analysis of the Commission showed that TP is the only firm in Poland that 
can provide the infrastructure of the internet connection to the alternative operators 
(AOs). It had 100 % market share for the wholesale market. In the retailers market, TP 
has the firm called PTK, which is the subsidiary firm to the TP. PTK gives the internet 
service in the market as well. For the retailers market, it has the market shares between 
46 % and 57 %.  There are barriers to entry to the market. The infrastructure is costly 
and there are high sunk costs. Also the competitors of TP have low market powers.  
 
The Commission argued that the practices made by the TP were; proposing 
unreasonable conditions, delaying regulation process, limiting access to networks, 
limiting access to the subscribers, refusing to provide general information. According to 
the findings by the Commission; TP offered unreasonable conditions to the AOs to 
access the wholesale  broadband products; unnecessary formal requirements, technical 
rejections, going late to fix the broken lines; delaying negotiation process: TP did not 
meet the 90 day regulatory deadline for 70 % of the negotiations; limiting access to 
network; rejecting orders with unreasonable grounds; limiting access to subscriber lines, 
refusal to supply the General Information (GI) which is indispensable for AOs. 
Moreover, TP applied better conditions and the GI were easily accessible, quicker and 
cheaper for PTK as the evidences showed. Also the rejection rates of PTK were lower 
than those of the other AOs. The Commission found the internal documents and e-mails 
for intent that showed the plans of the TP.  
 
Then, the Commission looked at the likely effects on the market. The refusal to 
supply made by TP reduced the rate of entry to the retail market for the broadband 
internet services. The use of BSA and LLU services was low. In addition, the 
Commission claimed that TP practices were detrimental to the consumers because it 
caused low broadband penetration, high broadband prices, and low average broadband 
connection speeds. In January 2010, the broadband penetration in Poland was 13.5 % 
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and one of the lowest in Europe; average 24.88 %. Moreover, Poland had the lowest 
internet speeds in Europe by the fact that 66 % of the internet connection not exceeding 
the speed 2mbit/s but this was just 15 % in Europe. Lastly, the retail broadband prices in 
Poland are the second highest in OECD countries. 
 
Considering the objective justifications, TP said that it did not have enough time 
to conform the situation after the new regulatory environment and it had difficulties in 
developing IT systems and finding human resources for perform these projects. 
However, the Commission argued that TP was an operator with significant market 
power and it affected negatively the development of broadband services in Poland by 
abusing its dominant position. Thus the Commission imposed a fine of EUR 127.5 
million. The fine was decided according to duration of the infringement which is 4 year 
and 2 months. TP was also fined by the National Competition Authority of Poland for 
margin squeeze. As a result, TP had been fined two times but this situation did not make 
the Commission not impose fine to it.  
 
This was the first abuse of dominant position case of the Commission for a 
company of a country that joined the EU in 2004. TP appealed to CJEU but is not yet 
decided.
140
 The Commission referred to Deutsche Telekom decision and said that the 
specific sector regulations did not exclude the application of EU competition rules.
141
 In 
this case, the Commission used the refusal to supply definition and the objective 
necessity in the Guidance. In addition to that, the Commission looked at the likely 
effects on the competition. Consumer harm was investigated and there were statistics 
which show that consumers had been negatively affected from the situation. According 
to their analysis, the entry and expansion looked hard and there were barriers to entry to 
the market. Since the duration of the exclusionary practice was 4 years, the effects were 
more than expected according to the Commission. 
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As a result, the approach of the Commission in TP decision was in line with the 
Guidance and had effects based approach because of the analysis of objective necessity 
of input, likely effects on competitors and consumers, objective justifications and 
efficiencies. However, how the CJEU will evaluate the decision is very significant to 
determine whether the decision will be effects-base and compatible with the Guidance. 
 
2.4. EU Decisions on Margin Squeeze: 
2.4.1. Telia Soneria Decision:
142
 
 
Telia Soneria Sverige is a Swedish fixed line phone company and the network 
operator in Sweden. It is the owner of infrastructure that is the local metallic access 
network, local loops and copper wires that are needed for broadband internet 
connection. Telia Soneria offered internet in two ways; first was unbundled access to 
local loop and the other one was offered to ADSL products for wholesale users that they 
can supply broadband internet service to the end users.  
 
Konkurrensverket, Swedish Competition Authority, argued that Telia Soneria 
abused its dominant position by making margin squeeze in the sale of prices to ADSL 
products for wholesale users and the prices that offered to the end users. The prices in 
the end users market cannot cover the costs of the firm. Then Konkurrensverket brought 
issue to Stockholms tingsratt, the Stockholm District Court, and requested to fine Telia 
Soneria. Stockholms tingsratt asked several questions to CJEU about the condition for 
infringement of Article 102, the relevant market, anti-competitive effects, recoupment 
of losses and the establishment of the cost concepts, indispensability, whether it is 
possible to sell at a loss during the establishment of new technology or not. 
 
CJEU argued that on pricing practices, National Competition Authority (NCA) 
must look at the potential effects of the margin squeeze for competitors who are at least 
as efficient as dominant undertakings. There is no need to look at actual effects. Thus, 
according to CJEU, NCA must look at as efficient competitor test in addition to 
cost/price analysis which will analyze if wholesale and retail prices are abusive or not. 
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According to CJEU, the product is indispensable for the retailers. This may 
cause case to have anti-competitive effects. There can be cases in which input is not 
indispensable, but has anti-competitive effects. Therefore the firm should make an 
objective justification or economic justification, if the practice did not constitute an 
exclusionary effect. There is no need for the recoupment of loses for the case of margin 
squeeze, because sometimes prices are too high in wholesale market but not low in 
retail market. Firms do not necessarily have the possibility to recoup losses.  
 
In this decision, CJEU has similar points with Deutsche Telekom decision,
143
 
since it is asked to make as efficient competitor test. However, the decision states that 
looking at actual effects is unnecessary. This does not comply with what is stated in the 
Guidance. According to Krah and Bien, in Telia Soneria decision the CJEU has a vague 
approach.
144
 They find some aspects of the Telia Soneria effects-based, but some 
aspects as forms-based. In fact, there are three points of this decision that can be traced 
in the Guidance. The first point is that CJEU takes the margin squeeze as a separate 
form of infringement, not a form of refusal to supply as it can be seen in the Guidance. 
The second point is that the decision stated that recoupment of losses is not necessary. 
This also complies with the Guidance. Thirdly, the Court recognizes that exclusionary 
effects of margin squeeze can be outweighing consumer harm. This view also exists in 
the Guidance. Thus, the Telia Soneria decision has adopted effects-based approach 
although it has forms-based approach tendencies as well.  
 
Thus, although Telia Soneria decision includes as efficient competitor test and 
includes the requirement of the economic analysis, it is not possible to say that the case 
was effects-based and compatible with the Guidance because it said that the actual 
effects on the consumers are not necessary to be analyzed in margin squeeze cases. 
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2.5. EU Decisions on Exclusive Dealing: 
2.5.1. EDF Decision:
145
 
 
EDF is a French energy company that has dominant position in the market for 
electricity supply to the large industrial customers. Before the liberalization of the 
electricity market, EDF had near monopoly position in the market and still has 
dominant position in the industry after the liberalization. The French state is the major 
holder of the most (70 %) of the EDF share. It operates on the distribution, supply and 
trade of the electricity. There is also Electricite Strasbourg, subsidiary company of EDF, 
active in the electricity supply market in France and to large industrial customers.  
 
The Commission argued that the relevant product market for this case is the 
―supply of electricity to large industrial customers‖. EDF made contracts with the large 
electricity customers. The contracts that were made between EDF and the large 
industrial customers for almost all electricity volumes are exclusive and explicit clauses 
of the supply contracts (de jure exclusivity) that give customers strong incentives to use 
electricity exclusively form EDF (de facto exclusivity). Therefore, the Commission 
argued that the scope, duration and the exclusive nature of the contracts can have anti-
competitive effects. Then, these agreements can cause foreclosure effect and hinder new 
entries to the French market for supply of electricity to large industrial customers in 
France. Also, it can limit consumer choices. As a result, the Commission proposed 
commitments to limit the duration of the long term supply contracts not to exceed 5 
years and the market share of EDF will be reduced to 40 % until 2020.  As a result, the 
Commission modified the conditions of the contracts by accepting the commitments by 
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003.  
 
In this case the potential effects of competition were considered by the 
Commission. The likely effects of the abusive practices on consumer welfare are 
emphasized. These points are also raised by the Guidance. Therefore one can say that 
this decision confirms with the Guidance in terms of its approach. The other issue is that 
in the decision, the Commission proposed change in the terms of the contract. This 
means, the Commission has this power of interfering and regulating the market. In 
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addition, Guidance states that the longer the duration of the exclusive dealing 
agreement, the grater possibility of foreclosure effect.
146
 Therefore the decision of the 
Commission that required reducing the duration of the contracts could be compatible 
with the Guidance.  
 
2.5.2. Soda ash Decision:
147
 
 
Solvay is a company operates in nine European national markets; Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland and Luxembourg. It 
produces soda ash (sodium carbonate), an alkaline chemical commodity that is used to 
make glass and can be also used chemical industry for detergents and metallurgy. The 
relevant market for this case is soda ash. Solvay has the dominant position in soda ash 
market with 60 % market share in Europe. 
 
According to the Commission, Solvay abused its dominant position with rebates, 
exclusive dealing agreements, and contractual agreements in the EU countries. In the 
decision, there were other exclusivity clauses related to the tonnage of the soda ash, 
glass maker contracts. There were also competition clauses, which were the supply 
agreements that tie the consumer to Solvay. Besides, safeguard clauses in which Solvay 
and the companies will maintain long-term relations in case of the other firms offer 
better economic conditions to the firm were also mentioned.  
 
In the on-site investigations, the Commission found documents that showed the 
objectives of the rebates system. Also, according to the Commission, the rebates system 
of Solvay could create loyalty effect on consumers and limit the competition. Here 
Commission states that ―tying of consumers to Solvay products showed an exclusionary 
purpose.‖ In the end, the Commission concluded that the practice made by Solvay was 
exclusionary conduct. As a result, Solvay was punished by EUR 20 million. Then 
Solvay went on appeal. Then CJEU uphold the appeal and reduced the fine to EUR 19 
million. 
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The effects of the exclusive clauses and the rebates were not evaluated by the 
Commission. Whish argues that Solvay case is a per se decision both by the 
Commission and the CJEU, and any exclusive purchasing agreement of a dominant 
undertaking could be abusive regardless of the potential or the actual effect on the 
competition.
148
 
 
The point is that the decision of the Commission was made in 2003, before the 
publication of the Guidance in 2009. It has less effects-based approach. Of course, the 
conduct of the CJEU did not consider the Guidance or more effects-based approach in 
the decision. The decision could be different and might have been a more effects-based 
approach, if it had been evaluated after the Guidance. Thus, the Commission and CJEU 
looked at the per se illegality of the exclusive dealing agreements. It did not mention 
effects of the schemes and did not present cost/price analysis or economic analysis.  
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CHAPTER 3: TURKISH COMPETITION AUTHORITY DECISIONS 
BETWEEN 2009-2013 ON EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT 
3.1. Turkish Competition Authority Decisions on Predatory Pricing: 
3.1.1. Knauf Decision:
149
 
 
Knauf is a producer of building materials and construction systems. According 
to the allegations, Knauf has dominant position in the plasterboard market
150
 and it 
abused its dominant position in the plasterboard and the plaster powder
151
markets by 
implementing predatory pricing and cross-subsidization according to the decision. 
 
In the decision, the CA states that plasterboard and plaster powder are in 
separate markets. In fact, the two materials have the same raw material; gypsum that is 
calcium sulfate dehydrate (CaSO4 2H2O) and can both be used in the construction 
sector. However, they are not the substitutes of each other since their areas of usage are 
different; the plasterboard can be used to construct walls and the ceilings whereas 
plaster powder can be used to stick and coat the walls. Thus, the relevant markets for 
this case were divided into two; ―plasterboard market‖ and ―plaster powder market‖. 
  
In the analysis of the dominant position, CA looked at the market shares, the 
production capacities of the firms in the market and the barriers to entry to the market. 
Then, CA argued that the market share of the Knauf was not high enough to say that it 
had dominant position in the market or not, and plasterboard market had increasing 
capacity but the market shares of Knauf have decreased after 2012. In addition to that, 
there were not any legal barriers to entry to the market but the sunk costs are high since 
the cost investment and starting production is high and hard to recover in case of exit 
from the market. However, there were new entries to the market in 2009. Moreover, CA 
evaluated that Knauf has high brand reputation and financial strength but did not have 
advantage to reach raw materials and there were no exclusive dealing agreements 
between the retailers and Knauf in the sector. Thus, after looking at the conditions of the 
Knauf and the market, CA could not decide whether Knauf had dominant position. 
                                                 
149
 Knauf Kararı, 09-59/1441-376, 16.12.2009. 
150
 alçı levha pazarı in Turkish. 
151
 toz alçı pazarı in Turkish. 
 46 
 
Nevertheless, CA assumed that Knauf had dominant position in the plasterboard market 
and then made analysis of predatory pricing.  
 
CA made cost/price, intent and recoupment analysis to investigate on the 
predatory pricing. For the cost/price analysis, CA looked at Average Variable Cost 
(AVC) and Average Total Cost (ATC) that are the cost concepts in AKZO 
decision
152
and Areeda-Turner Test
153
 that says prices below AVC is predatory; selling 
at a price between AVC and ATC is predatory, if there is intent and; the prices equal to 
and above ATC is competitive. CA referred to the Guidance with as efficient competitor 
test by saying that prices that are above the total cost cannot be evaluated as predatory 
since the these prices can only cause exclusion of a less efficient competitor. Then, CA 
calculated the costs of Knauf plasterboards and took into account the total effective cost 
(TEC) that is equal to or higher than the ATC. CA argued that it is viable to use TEC 
since it is most extensive one among the other cost concepts. In addition to that, CA 
made the cost/price analysis only for the product of Knauf with the highest sales rates. 
CA looked at the share of sales in the total plasterboard market, price, cost and profit 
rates of Knauf in 2008-2009.  
 
Then, CA found out that Knauf implemented prices below cost only for one 
month in 2008. Apart from that, there were fluctuations in the amount of the sales of 
Knauf in the beginning of 2009. CA concluded that, there was a decrease in the amount 
of the sales by Knauf. As a result of this situation, Knauf reduced the prices and the 
costs of stocks to meet the need of liquidity of the firm during the global economic 
crisis in 2009.  That is to say, there was an objective justification of the practices done 
by Knauf.  
 
In addition to that, CA checked that whether there were actual and likely effects 
due to predatory pricing. At the time when Knauf was selling at prices below costs, 
there were two new entries and none of the firms have left the market. Also the duration 
of the practice was one month which is not enough to evaluate whether it is a predatory 
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behavior or not. Additionally, no evidences or information of predatory pricing have 
found during the inspection. Therefore, the CA decision concluded that, pricing 
practices of Knauf cannot be an exclusionary practice.  
 
Apart from that, CA examined the cross-subsidization allegations. According to 
the complaint, Knauf has made cross-subsidization by making predatory pricing in the 
plaster powder market and recovered the losses of this market with the profits from the 
plaster board market. Then, CA analyzed the prices, costs and profits of the plaster 
powder between 2007- 2009 and found out that the prices of Knauf were below costs. 
Also, CA looked at the market shares and total capacities of the undertakings in the 
plaster powder market. The decision showed that Knauf can only be the sixth firm 
among the firms in the market and it was not possible to be a dominant firm for Knauf. 
Apart from that, since the prices in the plasterboard and the plaster powder markets had 
tendency to decrease and the profits in the plasterboard market were decreasing, it was 
not possible to recover losses of the pricing below cost practices in the plaster powder 
market with the profits from the plasterboard market. As a result, CA decision 
concluded that Knauf did not make predatory pricing and cross subsidization in the 
plasterboard and the plaster powder markets.  
 
Thus, in Knauf decision, CA made extensive economic analysis and adapted 
more effects-based approach. CA evaluated the cost/price analysis, the conditions in the 
market, the duration, actual and likely effects on competition, objective justification and 
the macroeconomic conditions at that time. Then CA argued that the reason of the 
pricing practices of Knauf is the economic crisis in 2008 and 2009 when all firms in the 
plaster sector and construction sector lost their revenues. In addition to that, the pricing 
below cost was only for a month, CA could not decide that was enough time for 
predatory pricing. If the duration was longer, the decision of CA could be changed. 
Besides, there was no documentary evidence on the predatory strategy that can show the 
intent. It can be argued that since there was no proof of intent, CA had tendency to 
analyze this case more with the effects-based approach. There can be a different way to 
evaluate this case if CA believed that it is a part of an exclusionary strategy. 
 
The analysis of CA is consistent with the approach of the Guidance since it 
included market structure, cost/price, intent analysis, effects of the pricing schemes and 
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whether there were objective justification. CA analyzed the market positions; relevant 
market conditions and the market shares of the Knauf and the competitors, the 
capacities, the expansion and entry and the countervailing buyer power in the 
assessment of the dominance.  However, there was no evaluation of the consumer harm. 
In addition, CA argued that to show the possibility of recoupment of losses is an 
essential condition for evaluation of the predatory pricing.
154
 Whereas, there is no 
requirement for recoupment of losses in the EU, that can be seen from the Guidance
155
 
and the case-law.
156
 Additionally, Uzunallı argues that CA followed the per se 
exclusionary approach of the EU that says prices below AVC are predatory and prices 
between AVC and ATC are predatory if there is intent. On the other hand, in the 
Guidance, the LRAIC and AAC are the criteria to determine predatory pricing cases
157
. 
Therefore, CA has not adapted the cost approach in the Guidance in Knauf case.
158
 
 
3.1.2. Türk Hava Yolları (THY) THY Decision159  
 
THY, Turkish Airlines, is the flag carrier air-lines company, headquartered in 
Istanbul and operates in domestic and international flights in carrying passengers and 
cargo. It currently became a joint stock company after the initial public offering.  This 
means the shares of THY are both publicly traded and owned by Republic of Turkey 
Prime Ministry Privatization Administration.
160
 There is also Anadolu-Jet that operates 
in domestic flights as a low-cost branch of THY. 
 
Pegasus Airlines, the privately-owned low-cost airlines company headquartered 
in Istanbul, made a complaint, alleging that THY was implementing predatory pricing 
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in domestic and international flights departing from Istanbul. Pegasus argued that THY 
was aiming to exclude Pegasus and the other rivals from the market. During the on-site 
investigations, CA found e-mails and notes about the pricing strategies of THY. Those 
documents show that THY deliberately reduced prices in some of domestic and 
international flights to be able to compete with the low cost carriers such as Pegasus 
Airlines. For example; according to e-mails by THY managers, Dusseldorf and Sabiha 
Gökçen (SAW) were the airports that THY have lost the market shares. For those 
airports, THY managers decided to stay in the market by reducing prices even it caused 
THY to lose profits. THY did not want rivals to exit from the market, but wanted to 
discipline Pegasus and the other rival firms with its low prices. As it can be understood 
from the internal e-mails were sent by the managers of THY, they closely followed 
which airports Pegasus would operate. Then, THY took precautions by lowering their 
prices in flights to those airports. Apart from that, the documents from the ―Turkish 
Airlines 2015 Strategy Meeting: Work Models‖ meeting show that THY planned 
strategies against the low-cost airlines. For instance, their strategies were not to leave 
Esenboğa Airport and SAW Airport although it caused losses. Also THY increased the 
number of flights from SAW with Atlas Jet; because THY flights caused higher cost in 
some destinations, and for not giving the opportunity to low cost carriers of thinking 
that THY was eliminated from the market. THY believed that, if it would leave certain 
airports and would not make flights in certain routes, the market power of Pegasus 
would increase. Also, the same documents showed that in 2010, THY made losses in 
domestic flights due to the fact that it increased the number of flights from the other 
airports in Turkey rather than Ataturk Airport (AHL). 
 
Then, CA interpreted those documents and e-mails as a part of the competitive 
concerns rather than a predatory pricing strategy. Thus, those documents were not 
counted as proofs of an abuse of the dominant position or the intent. As a result, CA 
decision concluded that the pricing practices of THY were not in the scope of abuse of 
dominant position and so it did not impose a fine to THY. 
 
However, CA decided that the slot rights that THY owned in the AHL and the 
bilateral agreements cause THY to be the sole carrier.
161
 This situation affected 
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competition in Turkish civil aviation sector negatively according to CA. It made THY 
advantageous in competition and disturbed the fair competition in the market. Besides, 
THY had privileges in its allocation of slots by Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs 
and Communications. CA decided that to maintain competition in the Turkish civil 
aviation sector, the allocation of the slots must be transparent, fair and non-
discriminatory and; the Ministry, Directorate General of Civil Aviation and the General 
Directorate of State Airports Authority must regulate the sector accordingly. Then, CA 
sent an opinion about the slot allocations and conformity with international bilateral 
aviation conventions to the related state bodies. 
 
This decision caused disagreement between the members of Competition Board 
(CB). According to different justification
162
 of CB members Reşit Gürpınar, İsmail 
Hakkı Karakelle and Murat Çetinkaya, the investigation made by the reporters of the 
CA was not detailed enough. There were missing parts in the investigation; reporters 
did not analyze whether SAW and AHL were substitutes for each other, there was no 
analysis and tests on the prices of THY, Atlas Jet and Pegasus, flight routes, flight 
times, capacity of the airplanes, whether there was a cross-subsidization between Atlas 
Jet and THY, cost/price analysis and profit/loss analysis of the three airlines companies.  
Additionally, Gürpınar argues that the analysis and the tests made by the reporters of 
CA were not enough to give a fair decision about the issue. He believes that there were 
sufficient tools and evidence that CA could investigate, despite that the test and analysis 
of reporters were inadequate. In addition, he declares that Turkish laws make CB 
members determine on the cases by depending on the economic analysis and 
evaluations made by the reporters. He thought that Turkish laws were insufficient and 
did not give CA members the right to abstain or sent the reports back and require more 
detailed analysis on the issues. Additionally, Karakelle and Çetinkaya believe that the 
information in the inspection was not enough to determine whether THY abused its 
dominant position or not. 
 
THY decision had an opposite approach to the Knauf decision in terms of 
economic analysis. In THY decision, CA failed to make almost any economic analysis. 
Interestingly, CA did not even make the geographical and relevant market definitions, 
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the assessment of the market power and the dominant position that are essential and 
fundamental parts of the determination of dominant position, as it is stated in the 
Guidance.
163
 To determine whether prices in the market were below costs, total revenue 
and profitability, ticket prices, number of flights and occupancy rate of a certain route 
should be calculated.
164
 However, in the decision, there were no cost/price analysis, no 
calculation of the cost concepts, no analysis of cross-subsidization, barriers to entry or 
exit to the market, likely and actual effects on consumers of the practice in the analysis 
of CA. Also in contrast to Knauf decision there was no evaluation of sacrifice or 
recoupment of losses. 
  
In addition to that, there were many documents and e-mails of THY through 
which pricing policies that can be proof of intent for predatory pricing. However, CA 
reporters argued that these documents could only represent competitive concerns 
without analyzing the effects of those pricing strategies to the market. Thus, THY was a 
controversial decision because of the weakness of the proofs and the lack of economic 
analysis. Besides, there are no calculations of sacrifice of profits or whether the duration 
of the practice is enough for the predation or not. In fact, there are some other decisions 
of CA in which there were proofs of intent and undertakings were fined. For example in 
Doğan Medya Group165, Solmaz Mercan166  and Türk Telekom167 cases there were 
evidences which show the intent of the firms as it is the case in THY decision. 
However, CA fined Solmaz Mercan, Doğan Medya Group and Türk Telekom because 
the evidences showed that the undertakings had intents to make exclusionary practices. 
On the other hand, despite the fact that it had already sent two separate opinions about 
the slot issue in two different cases, CA once again found sufficient to send a third one 
on the same topic.
168
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Additionally, just by looking at the page amount, one could say that THY case 
does not include extensive analysis. It has only 24 pages. There are more than 500 pages 
decisions in the aviation sector in the EU such as Ryan Air/Aer Lingus merger 
decision
169
 with extensive economic analysis. This point does not seem to be highly 
relevant, but on the other hand it still reveals a small clue about the lack of analysis. In 
addition to that, THY decision was far away from the Guidance. It did not have 
extensive economic analysis and calculations of cost concepts. There were not enough 
economic analysis and tests for objective justifications of the pricing practices. This 
means that the approach in THY decision is much more forms-based or per se illegal 
approach. CA only looked at the documents and the e-mails in the THY on-site 
inspections for finding out predatory pricing. However, the objective justifications CA 
found for the pricing practices of THY made me think that there was intent of predatory 
pricing rather than an aim to have competitive pricing strategies.   
 
Finally, in both Knauf and THY decisions, CA did not impose fine to 
undertakings. The Knauf decision was closer to the criteria in the Guidance and had 
more effects-based analysis than the THY decision. This situation illustrates that CA 
does not have a clear and distinct assessment of the predatory pricing and so, CA 
demonstrated a contradictory approach by choosing different tools for evaluating 
predatory pricing. 
 
 
 
3.1.3. Türkiye Denizcilik İşletmeleri (TDI) Decision:170 
 
Türkiye Denizcilik İşletmeleri (TDI), Turkey Maritime Facilities Incorporation, 
is a public undertaking. The firm carries passengers and vehicles with the ferries and 
ferryboats in Turkey. According to the allegations, TDI abused its dominant position 
that it had in Eskihisar-Topçular route by using technological, financial and commercial 
advantages of this route on other Çanakkale Strait routes through charging prices below 
the costs. 
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The relevant market in this decision was ―passenger and vehicle carrying service 
with ferries and ferryboats market‖.171 The relevant geographical market was Çanakkale 
Strait which included Çanakkale-Eceabat and Gelibolu-Lapseki ferries and ferryboats. 
The Eskihisar-Topçular route was defined as another geographical market. In the 
analysis of the dominant position, CA argued that TDI was the only company that 
operated in the Eskihisar-Topçular route at that time. The route covered 80 % of the 
total vehicles which were carried by TDI. Additionally, in Çanakkale Strait, there were 
no other ways of transportation except the existing sea routes. The only way to carry 
passengers and the vehicles were to use ferries and ferryboats in the market. However, 
TDI was not the only undertaking operated in that route; there were private sector 
undertakings in Kilitbahir-Çanakkale route. Besides, Çanakkale and Gelibolu routes 
could be substitutes of each other thanks to land roads between them. Thus, TDI was 
monopoly in Eshisar-Topçular route, but did not have the dominant position in 
Çanakkale Strait routes. 
 
CA explained that in addition the high market shares, TDI had some advantages 
in the market. For instance, the ferryboats of TDI had better qualities and in other routes 
TDI worked with more profits. Besides, the competitors of the TDI were smaller local 
firms with inactive capacity resulting from high sunk costs which made the entries and 
exits to the market harder. Harbors and ports, absolutely essential for carrying 
passengers were not sufficient for the new entries. This means despite the nonexistence 
of legal barriers for the entry to the market, there were economic and physical barriers. 
Some allegations also claimed that TDI did not allow the private undertakings to enter 
the market in Çanakkale Strait by asking them to pay high prices for harbors and ports.  
 
CA made predatory pricing analysis for Çanakkale Strait routes in ferryboat 
services. It stated that prices did not have to be under the costs for considering a practice 
as predatory; but they were important indicators of predatory pricing. Then, CA made 
cost-price analysis on Çanakkale Straits and Eskihisar-Topçular routes. It was found out 
that the prices of Çanakkale Straits routes were under the costs for three years. On the 
other hand, there was excessive profitability in the Eskihisar-Topçular routes in which 
TDI did not have any other competitors. CA stated that, there were sudden changes in 
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prices in Çanakkale Straits because of the new entrants and the loss of the market shares 
by TDI. Then, TDI reduced prices below 30 % of the costs and made losses in 
Çanakkale Strait routes. CA looked at the cost items of the TDI such as the prices of 
diesel to understand whether there were any reasons for decreasing prices. However, it 
was not possible to explain the reasons of the decrease in the prices with the diesel 
prices. There were no other efficiency reasons found by the CA which could cause a 
reduction in the prices.  In addition, the policy statements of TDI showed that, it 
compensated the losses of Çanakkale Strait routes from the Eskihisar-Topçular route. 
CA thought that, by making cross-subsidization between the two routes, TDI aimed to 
exclude rivals from the market. CA also analyzed whether the practices of TDI caused 
the exclusion of the competitors from the market. The decision said that, because there 
were high exit costs, the small firms could not exit from the market. Therefore, small 
firms, too, lowered their prices and this situation turned out to be price wars between 
them and TDI. As a result, CA decided that TDI abused its dominant position and then 
imposed fine to TDI.  
In this decision, CA made economic analysis by looking at the costs and prices 
and by evaluating if prices were below the costs or not. However, CA did not use the 
cost concepts in the Guidance; LRAIC and AAC, and did not make as efficient 
competitor test. There was an analysis of the sacrifice which revealed that TDI made 
losses in the routes. In addition to that, CA looked at the foreclosure effects by 
analyzing whether the rivals were excluded from the market. CA explored the 
documents of the TDI showing that TDI made cross-subsidization. Moreover, the 
efficiency reasons were evaluated. Despite all these, CA did not look at consumer 
welfare, which was an essential focus of the Guidance. It just looked at whether the 
practice had really happened and the competitors had been affected negatively rather 
than mentioning actual or likely effects on the consumers. Finally, one could state that 
TDI decision was not compatible with the Guidance. It did not have effects-based 
analysis although it had some economic analysis in accordance with the Guidance.   
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3.2. Turkish Competition Authority Decisions on Rebates: 
3.2.1. Doğan Medya Grubu (DMG) Decision:172 
 
Doğan Media Grubu (DMG) was accused of the abuse of dominant position in 
the daily newspapers advertisement spaces market by inducing loyalty rebates and 
premiums by Habetürk Media which was a new entrant to the newspaper market. DMG 
consists of group of companies active in newspaper, magazine and book publishing, 
television and radio broadcasting and production, internet, printing and distribution.
173
 
DMG also owns the newspaper companies of Hürriyet Gazetecilik ve Matbaacılık, 
Doğan Gazetecilik, Bağımsız Gazeteciler Yayıncılık and Doğan Daily News 
Gazetecilik ve Yayıncılık.    
 
For this case the relevant market was ―the daily newspaper advertisement spaces 
market.‖ In this market, the actors were the companies that want to give advertisements 
to the newspapers , the advertising agencies, the media planning and acquisition 
agencies (MPAA) that work as intermediaries between the firms that want to make 
advertisements, and the media companies; the newspapers.
174
 The companies go to 
advertising agencies and want them to prepare advertisements about their products. 
After that, they go to MPAAs to be able to reach their target group effectively and then 
choose the media companies most suitable for their products. For doing this, MPAAs 
make polls about the target groups of the newspaper, calculate the target group index 
and find out which target group fits which newspapers. Then, they try to match the 
products that wanted to be advertised with the newspapers. The companies that want to 
have advertisements in the newspapers tell the MPAAs the target group that they want 
to reach, then they choose the newspaper that offers the cheapest prices for per relevant 
target group.
175
  
 
Therefore, the market of newspaper advertising spaces is a two-sided market 
because newspaper companies compete for both the circulation and the advertisement 
revenues. CA stated that newspapers are not the substitutes of each other; buying one 
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newspaper does not keep consumers from buying a different one. Similarly, companies 
that want to publish their advertisements can give their advertisements to more than one 
newspaper at the same time. Thus, in case of the analysis of the dominant position, CA 
took into account both the circulation and the advertisement revenues and found out that 
DMG had stable market shares in terms of these measures. Additionally, CA looked at 
the newspaper preferences of the companies and showed that DMG newspapers have 
been chosen by the most of the companies when they gave advertisements to more than 
one newspaper. Especially Hürriyet, a DMG newspaper, is a must-stock item in the 
newspapers advertisement spaces market. This means that publishing advertisements in 
Hürriyet is necessary for the companies which want to reach their target group. This 
makes DMG an unavoidable trading partner for companies. Thus, CA argued that DMG 
has dominant position in the daily newspapers advertisement spaces market.  
 
In DMG case, during the advertisement process, MPAAs asked for price for the 
advertisements of the companies to the newspapers, or directly to the newspapers on 
their own. Then, DMG newspapers gave them prices for the advertisement spaces in per 
column centimeter. The prices changed according to the frequency of the advertisement; 
how many times it would be published, the place in the newspaper, the sections of the 
newspaper such as economy and sports, page number, whether the page was colored or 
black and white, the day of the week such as weekdays, Saturdays and Sundays. The 
DMG newspapers could offer discount schemes according to some conditions. So, it is 
not possible to say that there was only one standard pricing tariff for the advertisements 
on DMG newspapers. Hence, the MPAAs, DMG newspapers and the firms, which 
wanted to publish their advertisements, bargained on the prices.  
 
During the on-site investigations, CA found many internal documents and e-
mails between MPAAs and DMG newspapers. Those evidences showed that there were 
many discount schemes offered by the different newspapers owned by DMG. All 
different newspapers in DMG had their own rebates schemes with many different 
names; budget discount; was made according to the amount of the budget for 
advertisement given by the companies and the time period, weighted column/cm 
discount; was given if the newspaper is the most used newspaper in terms of 
column/cm, seasonal discounts; in  some months and seasons prices were cheaper than 
the others, first time advertisement discount and launch discount; was given to the 
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companies which gave their advertisements for the first time to a DMG newspaper, 
back-up advertisement discount; was made only for the advertisements that would be 
published within 7 days but one of the weekdays, area discount; given for the firms that 
want full-page advertisements, seasonal support discount; practiced due to the global 
economic crisis in 2008, budget growth discount; a kind of quantity discount was given 
if the firm increases the budget of advertising, DMG discount; was made if the 
advertisements were published only in the DMG newspapers, early contract discount; 
was given for the early annual contracts, block reservation discount; was given to the 
monthly advertisements according to their frequency.  
 
  There were also conditional rebates that could cause exclusive dealing such as: 
100 % column/cm Hürriyet discount; which was 41 % discount from the total price, 50 
% column/cm Hürriyet discount; that was 29 % discount from the total price. In addition 
to that, DMG newspapers also reduced prices for the firms that want to make their 
advertisements for the first time and made reference pricing practice; the pricing 
scheme of the last year could be practiced for the next year to the same companies or 
different companies. Thus, DMG newspapers had extensive and highly individualized 
rebates schemes, and did not offer a standard price for each company. CA also looked at 
the loyalty rebates of Habertürk that were growth and target rebates called as budget 
commitment discount, insert distribution discount, frequency discount. Apart from that, 
DMG had return and premium agreements with MPAAs that were the incentives given 
to the MPAAs if they were able to find more companies to newspapers for the 
advertisements in terms of the amounts of the total turnover.  
 
Then, CA evaluated the rebates schemes of the DMG newspapers. CA found out 
many documents and e-mails related to the rebate schemes. There were also documents 
that showed the prices of the rivals and the advertisement budgets of the other firms. 
According to CA, rebate schemes of DMG newspapers had loyalty inducing effects. 
There were rebates like 100 % usage of DMG newspapers caused the same effect with 
the exclusive dealing agreements. DMG aimed to stabilize its dominant position and 
high market shares and exclude rivals from the market at the same time. Thus, CA 
thought that rebates schemes obviously show that there was intent to abuse of dominant 
position. 
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CA also looked at the potential effects of the rebates rather than the actual 
effects. CA argued that the rebates schemes of DMG newspapers could cause loyalty 
inducing effects among the companies and had foreclosure effect in the market. Also, 
CA looked at the premium agreements with the MPAAs, found out that total number 
sales through MPAAs in the market were 40 %, 50 % , 55 %, 60 %  from 2006-2009. 
The share of the DMG newspapers sales in the budgets of MPAAs was the highest. 
Therefore the premiums could cause potential foreclosure effects in the market. CA also 
argued that the premium agreements can lead to information asymmetries between the 
firms and MPAAs and could hinder the optimal distribution of the advertisement 
investments by causing the companies not giving their advertisements to the most 
convenient newspapers in terms of the target group that could be reached. Thus, CA 
decision concluded that this situation could reduce welfare of consumers and 
companies.  
 
For the actual effects, CA argued that at the time when the DMG newspapers 
were applying the rebates schemes, there was a significant entry to the market by 
Habertürk newspaper. According to CA, DMG rebates did not cause exclusionary effect 
since Habetürk could successfully enter the market and got a considerable amount of 
market share. CA also evaluated the premium agreements between the MPAAs, looked 
at the shares of the newspapers sales in the budgets of MPAAs at the time of the 
premium practices, the correlation between premium per advertisement and the shares 
of the DMG newspapers in the budgets of MPAAs and whether MPAAs could able to 
reach the targets that were set by the DMG premium agreements. As a result, CA found 
that after Habertürk entered the market, the advertising shares in the budgets of MPAAs 
decreased, and therefore there was no correlation between the premium per 
advertisement and the shares of the DMG newspapers in the budgets of MPAAs and 
there were some MPAAs that could not meet the targets of the rebates.  
 
At the end, the decision concluded that DMG abused its dominate position and 
DMG newspapers imposed fine 0.75 of the total turnover. However, CB member 
Gürpınar argued in his different justification that, there is increasing tendency towards 
effects-based approach for the rebates in the EU seen by the Discussion Paper, 
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Guidance and the Intel
176
 and British Airways
177
 decisions. Also in Turkish case-law; 
Kalekim
178
, Frito Lay
179
 and Coca Cola
180
 decisions stated that the effects of the rebates 
must be evaluated for the decision of exclusionary rebates schemes. Nevertheless, 
according to Gürpınar, DMG decision was unclear in terms of the effects of the rebates 
whether they were competitive or anti-competitive. He argued that, the foreclosure 
effect by the DMG rebates and MPSAs premium agreements was not proven in the 
report. After the entry of Habertürk, DMG could not keep the market shares and 
Habertürk got considerable amount of market share. It could be a result of the 
competitive strategies of Habertürk. Another possibility is that the rebates did not have 
the effect on the market and then Habertürk was able to get considerable market shares 
in short time. There were potential anti-competitive effects of the rebates but the actual 
effects were unclear. Thus, it is not possible to say that the rebates were anti-
competitive only by looking at the potential effects according to Gürpınar.  
 
One could say that the availability of many evidences of intent might have led 
the CB to consider the situation as exclusionary behavior. It is also clear that there were 
potential effects in the decision whereas the actual effects were ambiguous. The entry of 
Habertürk to the market shows that there were no barriers to entry to the market. Also, 
the market share of the DMG newspapers has declined in the years of in which the 
rebates have been done. On the other hand, it is possible to say that, although Habertürk 
had some considerable amount of the market share, it could have gained larger market 
share if there were no DMG rebate schemes. Thus, economic analysis made in the 
decision is not sufficient to determine exclusionary behavior. 
 
Although the effects of the practices were analyzed in DMG case, it is not 
possible to say that the decision has an effects-based approach that is completely 
compatible with the EU law and the Guidance. Firstly, CA did not make as efficient 
competitor analysis that includes cost/price analysis with LRAIC and AAC. There was 
also no calculation of the effective price. In addition to that the Guidance states that in 
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two-sided markets also the costs and the revenues of the competitors may be 
analyzed
181
. However, in DMG cases there were no evaluation of the costs and revenues 
of the competitors. Secondly, no objective justifications or efficiencies were analyzed 
for the rebates. There was the analysis of the likely effects on consumer welfare. 
However these effects were hypothetical, they did not show actual effects. Therefore, 
they did not show if the rebates could cause consumer harm or not. Besides, the 
decision mentioned the special responsibility of the dominant undertaking. This 
responsibility was for protecting consumer welfare and refraining from abuse of the 
dominance. This point is very much similar to the Guidance states that the dominant 
firms have special responsibility to compete on merits and not to allow its practices to 
harm the competition.
182
 Therefore one could say that CA borrowed some points from 
the Guidance. 
 
Finally, the DMG decision is one of the longest decisions made by the CA. 
Despite that it was not that detailed. CA spent too much time to understand the nature of 
the rebate schemes of DMG. I believe it could be useful for CA to show the rebates 
were individualized and complicated. Also, it could be easier for CA to determine that 
the rebates could be exclusionary and have loyalty inducing effects. However I think, 
CA could be used the time that it spent to understand the structure of the rebates on the 
analysis of the effects of these practices in a much more detailed way. Apart from that 
CA only tried to understand the nature of the rebates and did not analyze actual effects 
of the rebates in the decision. Therefore economic analysis made here is insufficient to 
evaluate the effects of the rebates. It could be said that since there were many evidences 
for intent, CA did not include the economic analysis that much. 
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3.2.2. Kalekim Decision:
183
 
 
Kalekim is a company that operates in ceramic adhesive and joint sealants 
market, alleged that it abused its dominant position with premiums, coupons and the 
other practices. In this case, CA defined the relevant markets as ‗ceramic adhesive 
market‘ and ‗joint sealants market‘ and then investigated on the dominant position. It 
looked at the market shares, the amount of sales, revenues, and the production 
capacities of for both ceramic adhesives and joint sealants markets. In the ceramic 
adhesives market, Kalekim had 42.6 % - 47 % market shares, and did not have 
dominant position in the joint sealants market. However, since the market shares of 
Kalekim were not stable and changing through years between 2008 and 2010, CA took 
into account some other factors and analyzed the situation of the market. It finally could 
not reach a conclusion that whether Kalekim has dominant position in the ceramic 
adhesives market or not. Therefore, CA assumed that Kalekim had dominant position 
and investigated on the rebates and abuse of dominant position. 
 
The rebate systems made by Kalekim called as Kalekim Constructors Club
184
 
(KCC) and Kalekim Constructors Point System (KCPS)
185
. The aims of the KCC 
program were giving seminars and educations to constructors and enhancing their 
vocational knowledge, making them aware of the newest issues in the sector, and 
making the constructors to choose Kalekim‘s ceramic, paint, water and heat insulation 
materials. According to CA, KCPS was a loyalty inducing program and by adapting it 
Kalekim aimed to reach consumers through loyalty inducing program rather than 
technological investments. The services of KCC also included call center services, 
individual accident insurance plans, vocational training, seminars, courses and special 
promotions like machines and suits that constructors can use during their construction 
activities, journals and information services. Apart from that, Kalekim gave prizes to the 
constructors such as building materials and kits according to the points that they earned 
during the year.  CA argued that in this system, there were no discounts on the final 
selling prices. Thus, it was independent of the prices of the products. KCPS can be seen 
as a retroactive, increasing rate, standard targeted and growth premium system, but in 
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the decision, it was evaluated as a quantity discount rather than a loyalty rebate since it 
did not include exclusive dealing agreements and a constructor could benefit from more 
than one premium scheme at the same time. Also, the system was not individualized but 
it was standardized and quantity targeted. This means, the potential loyalty inducing 
effect of the rebate system was very low. 
 
In addition, CA could not find any documents or e-mails which showed that 
Kalekim had intent to make loyalty rebates and exclude rivals from the market. Then, it 
analyzed the effects of KCC and KCPS rebate schemes. Firstly, CA looked at market 
shares of Kalekim in ceramic adhesive market in terms of capacity, quantity and 
revenue. It found out that the average market shares of Kalekim is 18.7 % in capacity, 
37.9 % in quantity and 44.7 % in revenue from 2008 to 2010. Secondly, CA calculated 
the share of KCPS sales in Kalekim sales and in total sales in the ceramic adhesive 
market. They found out that the share of KPBS to Kalekim sales and total sales were 
26.2 % and 11.7 % in 2008, 11.8 % and 5.5 % in 2009, 1.9 % and 0.8 % in 2010, 
respectively. Thus, the budgets for the rebate scheme were decreasing. After that, CA 
looked at the share of the KCPS and KCC budget of Kalekim in ceramic adhesive and 
joint sealants markets and found out that, the cost of the rebates had very low share in 
the budget.  
 
CA also argued that, there was no time limit for the rebate schemes and they 
were very transparent and simple systems that only covered the constructors. The 
number of constructors that used these rebates was around 44.000. So, the exclusionary 
effect with this number could be very small. On the other hand, the effects of these 
rebates system were very little since there were many constructors in the sector that did 
not benefit from the rebates. There was also the fact that constructors are not the final 
consumers and decision makers of the constructions. They are just intermediaries that 
could give advice about the products and consumers do not have to consider what 
constructors have said for the product choices. Additionally, the rival firms were, too, 
making the rebate systems like KCPS and KCC. Also it is very important that, KCC and 
KCPS rebate schemes did not exclude the rivals from the market; yet there were new 
entries to the ceramic adhesive markets locally. 
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Besides, there was no proof of intent for the aim to exclude rivals from the 
market by practicing reward distributing system with premiums and prizes in the 
ceramic adhesive market. CA states that KCC and KCPS rebate systems had low 
potential to have loyalty inducing effect on the constructors and could not affect the 
market significantly. Therefore, the decision concluded that Kalekim‘s practices could 
not be considered as abuse of dominant position and exclusionary practices.  
 
The approach of CA in Kalekim case is closer to the effects-based approach. CA 
evaluated the actual effects of the rebates system, found out that the effects are too little 
to harm competition and did not conclude by declaring that the practices were 
exclusionary. Since no evidences related to the intent were found, CA inspected by 
adopting an effects-based approach. In Kalekim decision, CA used more effects-based 
approach than in it did in the DMG case. In DMG case, only the potential effects are 
mentioned, but the actual effects were unclear whereas in Kalekim decision, actual 
effects were more visible on competitors. In this case, CA did not analyze whether there 
is likely or actual effects on consumers. Therefore, the decision is not compatible with 
the Guidance. On the other hand, for the evaluation of the dominance, CA did not only 
observed the situation of the market but also it looked at the market shares, market 
position of the dominant undertaking and its competitors, expansion or entry and 
countervailing buyer power, as it was stated in the Guidance. However, there were no 
calculations of the effective price, contestable market shares and there was no as 
efficient competitor test with LRAIC and AAC. This shows CA again is selectively 
borrowing some points from the Guidance. 
3.2.3. Kale Kilit Decision:
186
 
Kale Kilit is the lock company operates in Turkey. According the decision, it 
had 60 % market share. The relevant markets that it operated were steel door locks 
market, wooden door locks market, iron door locks market, PVC door locks market and 
cylinders market. The geographic market was Turkey. 
The dealers that Kale Kilit made rebates were not the last sellers of the products 
but they were the wholesalers. Apart from that, Kale Kilit did not require the 
wholesalers not to sell the products of the other producers. The other lock companies; 
ITO Kilit and DAF Kilit, too, made rebates to their wholesalers. Kale Kilit did not make 
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exclusive dealing agreements. CA decided that the rebates schemes of Kale Kilit did not 
have intent to exclude the rivals. No documents had been found showing the intent of 
Kale Kilit. 
In the decision, CA did not mention the practices of the rebates in a detailed 
way. There were also allegations of the predatory pricing. CA made cost price analysis 
of the rebates and premium system of Kale Kilit. It analyzed four components; 
dominant position, extremely low prices
187
, intent and the recoupment of losses. Then, 
CA made as efficient competitor test by calculating the LRAIC and AAC. CA stated 
that the prices below LRAIC were not enough to determine if the dominant firm abused 
its dominant position or not. There must be also the intent of the dominant firm about 
the exclusion of the rivals. At the end of the cost-price analysis, CA found out that the 
prices of Kale Kilit were not below the costs. CA decided that Kale Kilit did not abuse 
its dominant position.  
In this decision, CA analyzed the dominant position of Kale Kilit and the market 
conditions, the costs and prices and made as efficient competitor test. CA took into 
account the LRAIC and AAC. As a result, the decision included economic analysis as it 
was stated in the Guidance. Besides, CA looked at the intent of Kale Kilit and could not 
find any documents which revealed the intent of the firm. Looking at the intent was 
compatible with the Guidance which says that the documents about the plan of the firm 
could be used in the analysis of the exclusionary practices. Another important point is 
that, the decision stated that prices below LRAIC could be abusive if there was the 
abusive intent of the dominant company. This statement was not included in the 
Guidance whereas in the Post-Danmark decision of 2012 it was stated that prices below 
LRAIC could be abusive if there were anti-competitive effects of the practice.
188
 
Decision, the Court shared the same idea about the intent. In addition, the Guidance 
states that it is not necessary to look at the recoupment of losses. However in Kale Kilit 
decision, CA analyzed the recoupment of the losses despite the fact that it did not 
analyze the consumer welfare. There was no analysis of whether the practices of Kale 
Kilit caused consumer harm or not. It also did not analyze the harm on the competitors, 
the presence of objective justifications and efficiency reasons for the practices of Kale 
Kilit. The effects of the practice on the consumers and the market were missing too. 
Thus, although there was economic analysis in the decision, the approach of the CA was 
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not effects-based. In conclusion, Kale Kilit decision was not a forms-based decision. 
However, one could not argue that it adopted an entirely effects-based approach. The 
point is that the CA had economic analysis, which was consistent with the Guidance; 
but not completely sufficient for considering the decision as effects-based.   
Finally, DMG, Kalekim and Kale Kilit decisions show that while there is more 
effects-based trend in Turkish Competition Law for evaluating rebates; there are still 
some misfits and inconsistencies between the decisions and the Guidance. For example, 
in DMG and Kalekim decision the likely effects on the consumers were analyzed but 
there were no calculations of the cost concepts and no as efficient competitor test. On 
the contrary in Kale Kilit decision, CA made as efficient competitor test by using 
LRAIC and AAC but did not mention the actual or likely effects on the consumers. 
Thus, what CA usually has tried to understand is the conduct more than the potential or 
actual effects of the competition. 
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3.3. Turkish Competition Authority Decision on Refusal to Supply:
189
 
3.3.1. Sanofi Aventis Decision:
190
 
 
Sanofi Aventis is a pharmaceutical company active Turkey which was accused 
of refusal to supply in drug distribution market and abuse of its dominant position. 
Sanofi Aventis changed the sales conditions and gave short maturity periods to the 
pharmaceutical distributors below a certain purchase threshold, but long maturity 
periods to the pharmaceutical distributors above a certain purchase threshold. 
In Turkey, the actors of drug distribution sector are pharmaceutical companies, 
pharmaceutical distributors and pharmacies.
191
 Pharmaceutical companies send their 
products to pharmaceutical distributors and pharmacies procure from the distributor 
according to their needs. This happens because the pharmaceutical distributors can have 
more space to stock medicines and can create special conditions to keep medicines such 
as cold chain system. It is hard for the pharmacies to maintain the necessary conditions 
to keep medicines. 
 
In the pharmaceutical sector, there are large-scale pharmaceutical distributors 
that operate all over Turkey and also small-scale pharmaceutical distributors that 
operate locally. The pharmacies can procure from one or more pharmaceutical 
distributors depending on their needs. The preferences of pharmacies depend on the 
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speed of the pharmaceutical distributors to bring them the medicines and the variety of 
the types of medicines that pharmaceuticals distributors sell. Apart from that, the 
pharmacies take into account the maturity and the quantity that they can agree with the 
pharmaceutical distributors. In Turkish healthcare system, the pharmaceutical sector is 
regulated by the state and the rates of profits were predetermined by the Social Security 
Institution (SSI). SSI pays some of the medicines completely, some of them partly and 
does not pay for some of them at all. Thus, for certain medicines, pharmacies get 
payments from the SSI completely or partly. However, these payments from SSI take 
time and the average maturity period of SSI to make payments to the pharmacies 
reaches up to 60 days. In this context, the maturity becomes very important for the 
pharmacies. Since pharmacies do not get the money at the time they sell the medicine, it 
is not possible for them to make the entire payment of pharmaceutical distributors 
immediately. Besides, the discount rates and volume discounts given by pharmaceutical 
distributors are also important for the pharmacies in choosing the pharmaceutical 
distributors. The bargaining goes on between the pharmaceutical distributors and 
pharmacies on the maturity periods and on the discount rates and volume discounts. 
Thus, the competition between the pharmaceutical and distributors depends on the 
speed, the variety of the medicines they sell, the maturity, the discount rates and volume 
discounts. As for pharmacies, CA argued that individuals choose the pharmacies that 
are closer to the healthcare organizations that their medicines had been prescribed. 
Thus, since the products and prices are the same, the competition between the 
pharmacies depends on the location of pharmacies as it is the case in Hotelling‘s 
model.
192
 
 
As it has been mentioned above, there are some medicines that the SSI pays and 
some that it does not pay. When the state does not pay for a certain medicine or 
pharmacies do not have these medicines in their stocks, they can give the generic 
medicines
193
 to patients. The patients do not have to buy these generic medicines which 
are not prescribed by doctors; but on the other hand they have to pay money if they 
want to but for the prescribed medicines. Here CA made two points. First, it argues that 
pharmacies can direct consumers to buy the generic medicines. Secondly, CA concludes 
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that the generic medicines are not the substitutes of the original medicines. They are just 
the therapeutic equivalents of the original medicines that include the same active 
ingredient with the same amount and the same dose. The generic medicines are usually 
produced by the small-scale firms pharmaceutical companies with lower costs after the 
patent of the original medicines ended. They usually do not spend money on innovation 
and research for the new medicines, but produce existing medicines with lower costs 
and sell with lower prices. Here, CA used the ATC-3 level to define to group 
pharmaceutical products as it can be seen also in the Astra Zeneca Case.
194
  As CA 
states, the pharmacists cannot give patients other medicines with different active 
ingredients other than the ones prescribed by the doctors. This means after its 
prescription by a doctor, a medicine can no longer have a substitute that is in the same 
ATC-3 level with it. Therefore, the demand for a medicine is determined when the 
doctor prescribes it. After the medicine is prescribed, the only way to change the 
medicine is to buy a generic one. 
 
Under the light of all these, in order to define the relevant market, CA made 
analysis of the medicines produced and sold by Sanofi Aventis in Turkey. There were 
64 medicines that Sanofi Aventis produced. Then, CA decided that there were 64 
relevant markets in the medicine sector that Sanofi Aventis produced according to the 
active ingredients. CA found out that there were 28 different medicines with 27 
different active ingredients without generics. This means Sanofi Aventis had 100 % 
market shares in 27 different markets. 
 
In addition, Sanofi Aventis changed the sales conditions. It put a threshold 
amount of 250.000 YTL per month and reduced the maturity period from 60-180 days 
to 15 days for the pharmaceutical distributors that buy less than the threshold. Then, CA 
consulted with the pharmaceutical companies, pharmaceutical distributors and 
pharmacists about the new selling conditions presented by Sanofi Aventis. Almost all 
pharmaceutical distributors told that they were in disadvantaged situation due the 
practices of Sanofi Aventis. The first reason for this was that threshold could make 
pharmaceutical distributors buy more than their needs, make excess and bear extra stock 
costs. Secondly, since the threshold was too high for small-scale distributors, they 
                                                 
194
 Case C-457/10 Astra Zeneca v Commission,  6 December 2012. 
 69 
 
cannot buy in that amount and it can cause them to stop to get medicines from Sanofi 
Aventis. Therefore, pharmacies would not prefer to work with Sanofi Aventis if 
pharmaceutical distributers could not supply the medicines of it. As a result, pharmacies 
may prefer to work with large-scale pharmaceutical distributors with more variety of 
medicines. This situation would of course destroy the competition and make small-scale 
pharmaceutical distributors exit the market. 
 
 Additionally, CA argued that, in future, there would be less pharmaceutical 
distributors. This would increase the concentration level in the market. If this happens, 
the bargaining opportunities between pharmacies and large-scale pharmaceutical 
distributors could decrease and distributors use this for their advantage, by decreasing 
the discounts. In addition, generic producer companies would need to pay more 
distribution costs since they could not bargain with the pharmaceutical distributors. The 
end result would be the increase of public spending on medicines. Besides, the 
concentration level in the market would create barriers to entry and hinder new entries 
to the market. Here what Sanofi Aventis was doing in general will cause negative 
effects on the market according to CA.  Additionally, CA found out that after those 
abusive practices, 24 out of 55 pharmaceutical distributors did not buy from Sanofi 
Aventis and only 9 of them bought less than the amount of threshold. Distributors had 
to sell the medicines that they bought for 15 days of maturity with 60 days of maturity; 
so they lost 3 % of their profits. 
 
At the end, no objective justifications or efficiency gains were found by CA in 
Sanofi Aventis case. Then, the decision concluded that, Sanofi Aventis abused its 
dominant position and as a result, CA imposed fine. However, CA did not say anything 
about the type of the abuse and further debates arouse. It was only Süreyya Çakın, one 
of the CB members, raising the point that what Sanofi Aventis doing was refusal to 
supply in his Opposite Vote. Nurettin Kaldırımcı makes a different judgment and argues 
that the sector is already regulated and therefore CA should not intervene with the 
sector. 
 
Sanlı, on the other hand, does not think that Sanofi Aventis made refusal to 
supply. His first point is that for a practice to be considered as refusal to supply there 
must be vertically integrated firms. Sanofi Aventis, however, is a not vertically 
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integrated pharmaceutical company with a pharmaceutical distributor. Secondly, Sanofi 
Aventis did not refuse to give medicines but just changed the selling conditions.
195
 
Aslan makes another point and argues that Sanofi Aventis is an atypical decision of CA 
and it was the first time that an undertaking, which was not vertically integrated, was 
fined in relation to refusal to supply. Aslan states that CA did not evaluate whether there 
were objective justification for the refusal or whether the input was essential. Besides, 
Sanofi Aventis decision has the aim to protect small-scale firms, although the protection 
of the small-scale firms was not the aim of CA.
196
 
  
Both Aslan and Sanlı argue that it is possible to evaluate this decision not under 
the refusal to supply, but under the price discrimination.
197
 If one considers this decision 
as a refusal to supply case, it is not compatible with the Guidance and effects-based 
approach. However, if one considers this decision as a price discrimination case, it can 
be counted as more effects-based. The reason is that because the effects of the 
discriminatory practice can be evaluated as the effects on the small-distributors. 
However, it is hard to explain and price discrimination is not something analyzed in this 
study.  
The above-mentioned scholars state that if the small-scale firms were excluded 
from the market, the market will be less concentrated. However the increasing level of 
concentration could have positive effects on the market such as economies of scale or 
reducing the costs. The reason is that it could be cost efficient to procure large-scale 
distributors with large amount of orders, rather than many small-scale distributors with 
little amount of orders. Here CA investigates the potential effects of the case on the 
competitors rather than the actual effects. Besides, the Guidance states that, typically in 
refusal to supply cases the firms are vertically integrated. However in the decision, there 
is no objective justification answering the question that why a firm that is not vertically 
integrated involve in refusal to supply.
198
 The decision also lacks of efficiency reasons. 
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Thus, on the one hand CA makes economic analysis and refers to the Guidance. On the 
other hand and actual effects and the analysis of consumer welfare were missing. 
Therefore it is hard to say that this decision had a thorough effects-based approach.  
 
3.3.2. Türk Telekom Decision:199 
  
Türk Telekom is Turkish Telecommunications Company that was accused of 
abusing its dominant position by refusal to supply of the infrastructure to internet 
service providers (ISP) companies. Türk Telekom also had TTNET as its subsidiary in 
downstream market. Türk Telekom was a state monopoly. After privatization, CA 
argued that Türk Telekom had legal rights to be a monopoly until its market share 
decreases under 50 %. According to CA, Türk Telekom has the right to be a legal 
monopoly and absolute dominant position in the ―infrastructure for corporate users 
broadband internet services market‖, ―infrastructure for local users narrowband internet 
services market‖, ―infrastructure for local users broadband internet services market‖ and 
―royalty related long distance data transfer including market‖. 
 
In telecommunications sector, building a new infrastructure is costly. There are 
economies of scale if the infrastructure has already built because marginal costs are low 
but there are high sunk costs. Also, the same infrastructure can be used for the voice and 
broadband data transformation. As a result, marginal cost is low for the firms who had 
infrastructure. However, the situation is not like that for the new entrants. For them, 
these costs are high and require building new infrastructure. For this case, Türk 
Telekom is the only firm that can provide the infrastructure for broadband and 
narrowband internet services to ISPs. The ISP firms paid royalty rents to Türk Telekom 
in this process.  
 
Because of the fact that Türk Telekom is the only supplier of the infrastructure 
of the internet services, the infrastructure of Türk Telekom is an essential facility for 
ISP firms. According to CA there is a test with four conditions for essential facility 
doctrines. These are: -the essential facility has to be controlled by a monopoly 
undertaking, -as a new entrant it is not possible to build a new infrastructure, -monopoly 
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undertaking refuses to the demands of the new entrant and, -the use of the essential 
facility is feasible. 
 
To evaluate an input as an essential facility CA argued that it is enough to have 
at least two of the conditions above. Then CA found out that the input and the rent and 
the supply of the inputs controlled by the Türk Telekom. It was a natural monopoly and 
continued to be a legal monopoly and then it was not possible for a competitor to build 
the infrastructure. Türk Telekom is the single provider in the internet infrastructures 
market in Turkey. Then CA evaluated the practices of Türk Telekom in four different 
markets.  
 
According to the complaints, Türk Telekom did not supply the infrastructure in 
the ISPs in narrowband internet services market, delayed service for the network 
demands, restricted the usage of some internet services, refused to supply Cable TV and 
telephone networks for internet services and degraded the supply of  the numbers of 
lines that in royalty including market. Additionally, the ISPs argued that Türk Telekom 
supplied TTNET more quickly. There were also other types of abuse of dominance in 
Türk Telekom decision such as predatory pricing. 
 
In addition to complaints of the predatory pricing, CA evaluated the refusal to 
supply. It found out that Türk Telekom degraded the supply of the numbers of lines that 
in royalty including market and also made predatory pricing in the internet services 
market. As a result, CA imposed a fine to Türk Telekom. This case is important since 
CA adapted a similar view by defining essential facility within the context of the 
Guidance. On the other hand, CA did not look at the actual or likely effects on 
consumers and competitors. For example the way new entries or exits were influenced 
from the practice was of Türk Telekom was missing. There may be negative effects of 
competition on the welfare of consumer. However this information again was not 
evaluated. Besides, CA did not mention whether the practice create efficiencies or have 
any objective justification. However, the Guidance evaluates the efficiencies. If there 
are efficiencies and the practice was objectively necessary it may not be taken as the 
abuse of the dominant position. Besides, in the Guidance it is stated that to name a case 
as refusal to supply, one must look at whether the elimination of the rivals in 
downstream market is possible. 
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This decision was given after Council of State returns it. The first case of 
TTNET in 2006 included the definition of the essential facility. After the Council of 
State overturned the decision, in the first decision, the definition of objective necessity 
was added. This definition is similar to the 83rd paragraph of the Guidance
200
. 
 
As a result, TTNET decision analyzed the objective necessity of the input and 
whether the input is objectively necessary in line with the Guidance. However, the 
Guidance lists three enforcement priorities on refusal to supply and margin squeeze 
cases which are; refusal relates to the objectively necessary input or service, refusal 
likely have elimination of the effective competition on the downstream market, refusal 
is likely to cause consumer harm
201
. The difference between the approach of CA and the 
Guidance is that the Guidance includes the evaluation of the consumer harm and 
efficiencies of the practice. On the other hand, CA analyzed practice analyzed whether 
the practice was happened and foreclosed the competitors. Therefore the decision did 
not include sufficient economic analysis and effects-based approach. 
 
3.3.3. CNR Decision:
202
 
 
CNR is a fair organization company operates in Turkey. It organizes fairs, and 
also provides services for security, catering and setting up the stands of the fairs. 
According to the allegations by the NTSR, another fair organization company, CNR 
abused its dominant position in yachting and water sports fairs organization market. In 
this decision, the relevant market was yachting and water sports fairgrounds 
management market
203
. The geographic market was defined as Istanbul.  
 
As it was stated in the decision, the trade fairs are very important, since they 
bring producers, distributors and importers together. Through fairs, producers can make 
advertisements of their products. Thus, the fair organization is a two-sided market with 
fairgrounds management firms, fair organizers and exhibitor firms. The fair organizers 
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rent fairgrounds by signing contracts with the firms that want to get involved in the 
fairs. It is very important to find appropriate areas for fairs especially for products like 
machines and automobiles, which need large spaces. The fairs of yacht and the boats 
also need large spaces. Besides, large fairs with many exhibitors can only be made in 
the large fairgrounds. However, the number of large fairgrounds with sufficient 
infrastructure and equipment is limited. Therefore, large fairs can only be made in 
specific fairgrounds. The largest of these fairgrounds in Turkey was the Istanbul Fuar 
Merkezi (IFM). It had ten halls; eight of which run by the CNR and the other 2 were run 
by the IDTM.
204
 The halls of the CNR were larger than the halls of the IDTM. Then, it 
could be said that the halls of the CNR were more suitable for the large fairs. NTSR 
applied to CNR for fair organization in yacht and water sports. However, CNR refused 
to rent the fairgrounds to the NTSR for the yacht and water sports fairs. It argued that 
the fairgrounds were not available during the dates that NTSR wanted to organize the 
fairs. Then, NTSR agreed to organize its fairs in other halls that were run by the IDTM. 
However, since the fairgrounds run by the IDTM were smaller than the fairgrounds of 
CNR, NTSR could not exhibit their products efficiently.  
 
Then CA analyzed the market conditions. Until 2007, NTSR made fairs in the 
CNR halls. However, in 2009 NTSR could not organize fairs and as a result the market 
share of the CNR became 100 %. CA also looked at the other fairgrounds such as 
Zeytinburnu Marina, Pendik Marina, Kazlıçeşme and Feshane.  However, at the end, 
CA decided that the other fairgrounds were not the substitutes of the CNR halls at that 
time except Pendik Marina. However, the construction of the Pendik Marina was not 
finished at that time. Furthermore, in the analysis of the dominant position, CA 
compared the IDTM and the CNR fair areas by looking at the total sales and the size of 
the fairgrounds in terms of square meters. In this decision, the upstream market was the 
fairgrounds organization for yachting and the water sports and the downstream market 
was yachting and water sports organization market. CA looked at the presence of the 
dominant position of the CNR in the upstream market. In addition to that, CA analyzed 
the situation of the market after the CNR refused to rent the fairgrounds to the NTSR. 
As mentioned above, until 2007 NTSR made yachting and water sports fairs in the CNR 
fairgrounds. In 2006, CNR did not explicitly refuse NTSR but argued that its halls were 
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filled up by the other firms. Then, NTSR organized fairs in 2007 and 2008 IDTM halls, 
in 2009 NTSR wanted to made fair in Pendik Marina but the construction of it was not 
finished.  As a result, NTSR did not make the yachting and water sports fairs in 2009.  
 
CA argued that for trade of the products the fairs are very important and even 
one year can cause losses. As a result, CA argued that if NTSR could not organize fairs, 
it means that the NTSR would leave the market and cannot be an efficient competitor. 
On the other hand, CNR continued to organize fairs. If NTSR leaves the market, the 
competition of the market would be affected negatively. The concentration would 
increase and the number of the competitors in the market would decrease. It would not 
necessarily mean that CNR was more efficient firm and because of that it continued to 
be in the market while the less efficient competitor had to leave the market.   
 
 Apart from that, CNR started to make yachting fair called as Eurasia Boatshow 
Fair since 2007. It made CNR a vertically integrated firm in yacht and water sports fairs 
market. For this fair, CNR used seven halls of IFM although it gave three halls to NTSR 
fairs in the past. CA argued that CNR doubled the size of the yachting fair in square 
meters. Then CA looked at the number of exhibitors, visitors the area of the fairs, total 
sales of the fairs that Eurasia Boatshow and the NTSR made. Also, CNR did not change 
its pricing policies for exhibitors between 2007 and 2010. Even though, in 2009, NTSR 
did not organize a fair and the CNR Eurasia Boatshow did not have any alternatives, 
CNR did not increase prices. According to CA, those prices can be a reason of the abuse 
of the dominant position. On the other hand, CNR replied to NTSR, that it can arrange 
the fairgrounds if NTSR changes the dates. CA argued that, this situation showed that 
CNR did not have the intent for the abuse of the dominant position. However, NTSR 
did not ask CNR for the new dates but asked Pendik Marina for the fair. This situation 
showed that there were alternatives for the CNR halls. At the end, CA decided that, 
CNR did not abuse its dominant position in the yachting and waters ports fairs 
organization market. CA argued that CNR was more efficient than the NTSR by 
organizing a larger fair. NTSR should make changes and renewals to compete with the 
CNR. On the other hand, CA argued that although the fairgrounds were empty for the 
time period that, CNR showed them full to NTSR by making simulated contracts
205
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with the firms of CNR undertakings. CA found out that CNR made tricks not to meet 
the demand of the NTSR. Then, CA imposed fine to the CNR because of the false and 
misleading information.  
 
Furthermore, CNR decision caused debates between the CB members. In the 
opposite vote by Cevdet İlhan Günay and Murat Çetinkaya argued that, CNR was a 
more efficient firm than the others in the yacht and water sports fairs market. However, 
CNR abused its dominant position because the practices such as simulated contracts 
were abusive, since, there were no objective justifications. In addition to that, the other 
two CB members Mustafa Ateş and Mehmet Akif Ersin thought that the geographic 
market definition of the decision was too narrow. Not only Istanbul but also other cities 
like Antalya, İzmir and Bodrum should be included in the relevant market definition. 
They also add that, yachts and boats were luxury goods which appeal the rich part of the 
consumers with the high welfare levels. These types of consumers could bear the costs 
which were needed to reach the products. As a result, consumer welfare would not be 
harmed depending on the where the fairs has done. Thus, CNR fairgrounds were not 
essential facility for the yachting and water sports fairs market. According to Ateş and 
Ersin, this situation showed that CNR did not have dominant position in the market 
since it had substitutes if the market definition was expanded.  
 
As it was seen, CNR decision was very controversial. The CB members cannot 
decide on whether the CNR fairgrounds were essential facility or not. This analysis of 
the essential facility was compatible with the Guidance, although it caused debates 
between the CB members. For the market definition, CA made SSNIP test for the other 
fairgrounds in Istanbul, Antalya, Izmir and Bodrum. It was found out that other 
fairgrounds for yachting and water sports in Istanbul and other cities cannot be 
substitutes of the CNR fairgrounds. This analysis of the market by using the SSNIP test 
was also compatible with the Guidance. Furthermore, I believe this decision had some 
other points convenient with the Guidance. CA looked at the efficiencies that were 
created by the CNR after the Eurasia Boatshow Fairs, analyzed the economic data of the 
fairs. In this decision the refusal to supply must have an objective justification for not to 
be considered as the abuse of the dominant position. CA looked at the objective 
justification, although some of the CB members did not think that there were objective 
justifications of the CNR. Also, the decision argued that because of the efficiency 
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reasons CNR did not abuse its dominant position. Looking at the efficiency reasons was 
compatible with the Guidance. In addition, the Guidance says that it may be necessary 
to analyzed the revenues and the costs of the both sides.
206
 CA analyzed the costs and 
the revenues of both CNR and NTSR which could be in line with the Guidance.  
 
On the other hand, CA did not analyze consumer welfare which was very 
significant and essential for the Guidance. The CA looked at whether the practice will 
cause NTSR to be excluded from the market or not. It analyzed effects on competitors 
rather than the effects on the consumers. In addition to that, CA fined CNR because of 
showing fairgrounds as full with the simulated contracts and false information given to 
NTSR. I think, giving the false information could be a part of the exclusionary 
practices. As the Guidance suggests, there must be objective justifications of the refusal 
to supply and the efficiencies. However, simulated contracts cannot be an objective 
justification of the refusal to supply. Thus the decision cannot be considered entirely 
consistent with the Guidance. It is true that CA analyzed objective necessity, 
elimination of the effective competition and efficiencies. However the consumer 
welfare was not analyzed. Therefore, the decision does not have an effects-based 
approach although it makes some economic analysis.  
 
3.4. Turkish Competition Authority Decisions on Margin Squeeze: 
3.4.1. TTNET I Decision: 207 
 
According to the allegations, Türk Telekom and TTNET abused their dominant 
positions with the pricing policies in broadband internet access services market. The 
relevant market of the decision were ―wholesale broad band internet access market‖ and 
―retail broadband internet access market,‖ where the Türk Telekom gave wholesale 
services to ISP firms and TTNET gave retail broadband internet accesses services. The 
relevant geographical market was Turkey. In this decision, Türk Telekom was the 
wholesaler of the broadband internet access service, and TTNET and other ISP firms 
were the retailers. 
                                                 
206
 Guidance, para 26,  footnote 3. 
207
 TTNET I Kararı 08-65/1055-411, 19.11.2008The decision was made in 19.11.2008 
which was before 2009. However I wrote about this decison because it was a relevant 
example with margin squeeze.  The decision also included the debates related to what is 
margin squeeze.  
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In the analysis of the dominant position, CA looked at the market conditions, 
market shares and the number of subscribers in the broadband internet access services 
market. CA stated that although ICTA did not declare TTNET as significant market 
power, it claimed that TTNET had 97 % market share. Therefore CA decided that 
TTNET had dominant position in the retail broadband internet access service market.   
Then, CA made cost-price analysis for both wholesale and retail markets to 
analyze the pricing policies and the margin squeeze. CA evaluated the ADSL prices in 
wholesale market, which were decided by ICTA from 2004 to 2007. It also analyzed the 
retail prices of TTNET, decided without the approval of ICTA within the same time 
period. In addition to that, CA looked at the campaigns of TTNET and the effect of the 
campaigns on the number of subscribers. In wholesale market, CA evaluated the profits, 
tariffs of TTNET, the wholesale prices and campaigns of Türk Telekom. It was found 
out that, the number of TTNET subscribers increased thanks to the campaigns of 
TTNET. Then, CA evaluated the market conditions and the market shares of the ISP 
firms. It looked at the number of subscribers of ISP firms and Türk Telekom, the 
average subscriber gain costs of Türk Telekom, costs, profits and total turnover of 
TTNET, profits and the cost of the gaining subscribers of the ISP firms. Then, CA 
analyzed the retail prices by looking at the retail market shares, and the number of 
subscribers of the retailers. In the analysis of the pricing policies, CA explored whether 
the prices of Türk Telekom and TTNET were below the costs or not. CA looked at the 
average acquisition costs and said that the average period of recovery for TTNET 
consumers can be 24 moths. However, CA looked at 36 months consumer data. The 
reason for using 36 months is to make it in favor of Türk Telekom and TTNET. Then 
CA found out that the prices of TTNET were below the costs and therefore TTNET had 
losses. After that, CA also analyzed the costs and prices of the ISP firms and found out 
that they could not make profits.  
In addition, CA mad investigations of the documents and e-mails of Türk 
Telekom and TTNET for being able to evaluate their general strategy. This process 
showed that Türk Telekom and TTNET had combined strategies that aimed to increase 
the number of subscribers. However, no documents revealing that Türk Telekom and 
TTNET aimed to abuse their dominant position by excluding the rivals from the market 
were found.  
Then, CA imposed fine to TTNET. However, the definition of the margin 
squeeze was highly debated by the CB members. Tuncay Songör, Sıraç Aslan and 
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Süreyya Çakın raised four main points about the decision in their opposite votes. 
According to their first point, if the wholesale prices were regulated, but the retail prices 
were not; this practice was called margin squeeze under partial regulation. If both 
wholesale and retail market prices were regulated, it was defined as margin squeeze 
under full regulation. Lastly, if the sector was not regulated, it was called as 
independent margin squeeze. At that time, both wholesale and the retail prices of Türk 
Telekom were determined by the ICTA, so the telecommunications sector was fully 
regulated. In relation to that, they argued that margin squeeze occurred in one of those 
following three conditions; increase in wholesale prices while retail prices are constant, 
increase in wholesale prices while retail prices decreased and when the wholesale prices 
are constant but the retail prices are decreased. According to them, at that time, Türk 
Telekom‘s wholesale prices and how Türk Telekom applied those prices were 
controlled by Information and Communication Technologies Authority (ICTA). 
Therefore, it was not possible to change the wholesale prices by Türk Telekom. They 
added that, the decision must be analyzed under the full regulation because both 
wholesale and retail prices of Türk Telekom and TTNET were under the regulation of 
ICTA. However, CA analyzed the decision under partial regulation. Moreover, they 
added that because the sector was fully regulated, the pricing practices of TTNET could 
not be defined as margin squeeze. Then, they defined the conditions that can cause 
predatory margin squeeze were charging prices below the costs, existence of intent, 
exclusion of the competitors, possibility of recoupment of the losses and non-existence 
of the objective justifications. Also, ICTA could declare TTNET as significant market 
power (SMP) if TTNET had dominant position. However, ICTA did not define TTNET 
as such. According to CB members, this showed that margin squeeze was not possible 
since TTNET did not have dominant position and could not control the prices in the 
market. The lack of SMP also made recoupment of losses impossible for TTNET, 
because TTNET did not have the power to control the prices.  
The second point of CB members was that, TTNET was established in 2006 and 
the decision was investigated just one year after the foundation of TTNET. They argued 
that, it could not be possible to make a healthy cost-price analysis with the data of one 
year. Also, they argued that the cost advantages of the vertical integration of Türk 
Telekom and TTNET were missing in the analysis of CA. The third point was they 
mentioned was that the competitors of TTNET did not leave the market. This situation 
showed that the other ISP firms were, too, made tariffs as advantageous as those of 
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TTNET and therefore the practices of TTNET could not be considered exclusionary. In 
their fourth point, the CB members declared that the campaigns and promotions of 
TTNET tariffs could increase the number of subscribers to the Internet and the 
competition in the sector. Therefore, it could not be considered as an abusive practice. 
As a result, this decision is relevant because of the definitions and the 
discussions related to the margin squeeze in a regulated market. In the decision, CA 
analyzed the market conditions, positions of the competitors and the market shares. This 
analysis could be compatible with the Guidance. Also, CA analyzed the cost and prices 
of Türk Telekom and TTNET but without using the LRAIC and AAC cost concepts and 
making as efficient competitor test. CA did not analyze the effects on the competitors? 
There was no analysis of the actual and likely effects on the consumers. CA evaluated 
the definition of the margin squeeze and whether it was the practice by the TTNET or 
not. CA analyzed the recoupment of losses, but the Guidance does not require the 
analysis of recoupment. There was no analysis of efficiency reasons, objective 
justification and whether the services of Türk Telekom were essential facilities or not. 
Therefore, this decision was not an effects-based decision and did not have sufficient 
economic analysis. It looks like CA aimed to protect the competitors rather than the 
competition and consumers. Also CA made the calculations of the customer acquisition 
costs from 36 months. However, it should analyze whether 36 months was enough and 
it should look at profits of each campaigns of TTNET separately or the overall profits. 
For example in Wanadoo case the period of spreading acquisition costs were adjusted to 
48 months.
208
 
3.4.2. TTNET II Decision:
209
 
 
Türk Telekom and its subsidiary TTNET have been accused of making margin 
squeeze with the pricing strategies in metro ethernet internet services. In Turkish ISP 
market, TTNET is one of the internet service providers; it is vertically integrated with 
Türk Telekom that supplies the infrastructure for ISP firms. TTNET and the other ISP 
firms can give the metro ethernet service to their end users through the infrastructure of 
Türk Telekom, which is the single provider of the infrastructure to access to fixed line 
phone network.  
                                                 
208
 COMP/38.233 -Wanadoo Interactive, Commission decision of 16 July 2003. 
209
 TTNET II 10-44/761-245, 17.6.2010. 
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CA made an assumption that Türk Telekom was a dominant firm as wholesaler 
and TTNET was a dominant firm as a retailer. The internet access service is provided 
by the Türk Telekom and ISPs usually pay rent for the infrastructure. Besides, there are 
different types of broadband internet access technologies in Turkey; such as copper 
wired networks; ADSL, fiber optic platforms; fiber internet, cable TV internet, Wi-Fi, 
ATM, broadband transmitter access and metro ethernet. However, ISP firms prefer 
metro ethernet service since it is a new technology which is easy to use as well. It is also 
cost efficient because it can provide flexible access to broadband internet services. Here, 
CA did not analyze whether the other broadband internet access technologies are 
substitutes to each other and then assumed that the relevant market for this case was 
―metro ethernet services‖ market. It also assumed that metro ethernet service was 
indispensable for ISPs to give broadband internet service access. 
 
CA mentioned that the telecommunications sector is regulated and the prices of 
the infrastructures are determined by the ICTA . According CA, prices of Türk Telekom 
were determined by adding 25 % margin to the prices of ICTA. However, Türk 
Telekom and TTNET were accused of making margin squeeze because TTNET did not 
charge prices by adding 25% margin, it did not even charge any connection fee and as a 
result provided internet services with low or negative profit margins.  
 
CA, then, examined if TTNET was able to meet its costs or not. It at the TTNET 
metro ethernet income and expenses, TTNET metro ethernet average income and 
expenses per subscriber, TTNET weighted of the average cost of subscriber
210
 gaining 
in 2009. In this income and expenses tables, there are cost concepts; that can show 
average cost concepts. CA found out that net profit and profit margins of TTNET metro 
ethernet services were positive. Therefore, the case could not be a margin squeeze 
practice since TTNET had positive profits. 
 
Besides, CA compared prices that TTNET charged from the firms for metro 
ethernet services and the amount that TTNET paid to Türk Telekom for metro ethernet 
and found out that there was only one firm that TTNET had negative profits. CA argued 
                                                 
210
 ağırlıklandırılmış ortalama abone kazanma maliyet in Turkish. 
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that this negative profit from one firm represented only 5% of the demand of the 
customers which means that it could not possible to exclude an as efficient competitor 
from the market. As a result Türk Telekom‘s practice could not have foreclosure effects. 
Therefore CA did not think Türk Telekom made an infringement. 
 
In this decision CA had many assumptions. For example it assumed that as Türk 
Telekom and TTNET had dominant positions in the market without making a 
dominance test. It also assumed that Türk Telekom and TTNET are in the same 
economic unity and can be considered as the same undertaking. After assuming that 
Türk Telekom and TTNET constitute the same undertaking, I think it is not necessary to 
assume TTNET as a dominant firm. As CA also stated in the decision, for the case of 
margin squeeze it is not necessary for the downstream firm to be in the dominant 
position. Additionally, CA made an assumption that metro ethernet was indispensable 
technology for the ISPs without analyzing whether the other broadband internet 
technologies could be the substitutes. 
 
For this decision, CA made an effects-based analysis by looking at the profits of 
Türk Telekom and TTNET and the number of subscribers that TTNET can gain at the 
time of these pricing practices. From the Guidance perspective, CA analyzed at the cost 
concepts and prices, and found out that there was no equally efficient competitor. 
However, these cost concepts used are not the LRAIC unlike the concepts used in the 
Guidance and Telia Soneria Decision
211
. Besides, there is no analysis of consumer harm 
or efficiencies. Also the services cannot be a necessary input for the market. It can be 
said that like EU, CA also accepts margin squeeze as a form of abuse of the dominant 
position. In addition to that, in this decision there was nothing related to the intent of 
firm for an exclusionary strategy. CA did not mention that whether they found 
documents related to intent or not.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
211
 Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB, 17 February 2011 
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3.4.3. Turkcell Decision
212
 
 
Turkcell is a GSM-based mobile communications company operating in Turkey. 
It was accused of margin squeeze because of the prices it offered in the internal market. 
These prices were lower than the prices that were gives as inputs to the other GSM 
operators. 
 
Vodafone, another GSM-based mobile communications company, complained 
that Turkcell was using its significant market power in the market of the calls that 
terminates in Turkcell‘s network with its tariff called as ―Bizbize Kamu Her Yöne 1200 
Dakika‖ (BBK-1200).  
 
For the evaluation of the margin squeeze, CA listed five conditions by referring 
the Discussion Paper and the EU case-law:  
-the dominance of a vertically integrated firm in upstream market, 
-the indispensability of the input in downstream market for the firm itself and its 
rivals in order to be able to compete and stay in the market,  
-the determination of the margin between upstream and the downstream market 
so low as to hinder profits of the dominant firm and/or as efficient competitor,  
-the presence of the possibility of giving rise to anti-competitive effects that will 
harm consumer welfare as the result of margin squeeze through excluding the rivals in 
the downstream market, hindrance of new entries to the market and/or limiting the 
activities of the rivals. 
  -the non-existence of objective justifications about the dominant firm‘s pricing 
policies that lead to margin squeeze. 
 
Thus, CA uses the same points with the EU. It argued that the input that Turkcell 
provides to the rival GSM-based mobile network operators is an essential facility
213
. 
                                                 
212
 Turkcell Kararı, 10-21/271-100, 04.03.2010. 
213
 In this decision, ―call termination‖ refers to the wholesale service that a network 
terminates the call made to one of its subscribers by a subscriber on another telephone 
network.  All mobile phone companies hold monopoly power in the market of the calls 
that terminates in their networks. That‘s because it is not possible making calls between 
two mobile operators without using each other‘s infrastructure. Thus, the internal 
network is an essential facility for the rival firms. The wholesale price that the 
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Also Turkcell holds the monopoly power in the market of the calls that terminates in its 
network.  
 
Then CA looked at the on-net call revenue created by BBK 1200 and by the 
other tariffs, the share of BBK tariff in total calls, the average on-net call time of BBK 
1200 subscribers. The changes in the number of subscribers in Turkcell‘s subscribers 
are examined. As a result CA argued that Turkcell lost subscribers through number 
portability
214
 and made the above-mentioned tariff to attract more subscribers. 
Therefore CA decided that Turkcell‘s practice is not for excluding rivals from the 
market, but not to lose subscribers. CA concluded that, there was an objective 
justification and it was a rational practice.  
 
CA made the same analysis for Vodafone as well. It analyzed the number of new 
subscribers of Vodafone, the number of total subscribers of Vodafone, the number of 
new subscribers that ported from Turkcell to Vodafone and from Vodafone to Turkcell, 
the total number of subscribers that ported to Vodafone and the total turnover of 
Vodafone in 2009. The conclusions drawn from this analysis as such: At the time of the 
practices made by Turkcell, 
-The rate of new subscribers of Vodafone has increased. 
-During BBK 1200 tariff, Vodafone continued to gain subscribers.  
 -Turkcell lost subscribers during the tariff through number portability to 
Vodafone.   
                                                                                                                                               
originating network pays to the terminating network for completing calls can be named 
as ―call termination charge‖. Also, a call to the subscriber on a rival mobile network 
refers to ―off-net call‖, and the call between two subscribers on the same network refers 
to ―on-net call‖. In the mobile telephone networks, call termination charges are one of 
the most significant incomes for the operators. They determine their prices for the 
subscribers according to the call termination prices in upstream market. For the 
economic analysis of a UK case related to mobile call termination, look at: Mark 
Armstrong and Julian Wright, Mobile call termination in the UK: a competitive 
bottleneck?  in Cases in European Competition Policy: The Economic Analysis, pp. 75-
100, edt. Bruce Lyons, Cambridge, 2009. 
214
 Number portability defined by ICTA as ―the ability of a subscriber to change the 
serving operator, the physical location of his/her own and/or the type of service without 
altering the number assigned for.‖ It was entered in force Official Gazzete No:26421 
dated 01/02/2007, 
http://eng.btk.gov.tr/elektronik_haberlesme_sektoru/yetkilendirme/numaralandirma/nu
maraTasimaSureci.pdf 
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-Vodafone gained new subscribers through number portability although number 
of subscribers that carried their numbers to Vodafone was less than the number of 
subscribers that carried their number to Turkcell.  
 
As a result, CA concluded that since Turkcell lost its subscribers to Vodafone 
and it did not lose profits, it is not possible to say that there is an exclusionary practice. 
Also the number of subscribers to BBK 1200 decreased when Vodafone gained new 
subscribers. Therefore, there is no possibility of recoupment of losses since Vodafone is 
not excluded from the market.   
 
As the other analysis, CA looked at the consumer welfare side. It found out that 
-the amount of traffic created by GSM operators increased from 23 billion 
minutes to 29 billion minutes; 89 % of the traffic was from on-net calls, 8 % was from 
off-net calls. 
-the average talking duration in minutes per subscriber increased.  
-the traffics created by Turkcell, Vodafone and Avea were increased. 
 
Therefore it is not possible to say that the BBK 1200 tariff caused consumer 
harm and decreased welfare. Instead, it must have increased consumer welfare. The 
number portability and those kinds of tariffs must have increased the competition as 
well according to CA. Therefore the decision concluded that there was no abuse of 
dominant position through margin squeeze in Turkcell case. 
 
CA analyzed the effects of the BBK 1200 tariff. According to the decision, since 
this tariff had a small amount in Turkcell‘s turnover, Vodafone was not excluded from 
the market and Consumer welfare increased as it can be seen from the increasing traffic. 
It is competition on merits, rather than an exclusionary practice. 
 
In its analysis CA could not find any documents about the exclusive strategy that 
shows the intent of Turkcell. According to Yavuz, the behavior of the dominant 
undertaking limiting competition is still essential even if there is no intent as it was 
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stated in the decision.
215
 The decision, therefore, had an effects-based approach despite 
the presence of some slight changes. In its analysis, CA used the patterns in the case-
law and Discussion Paper. One could say that it had similar approach to determine the 
essential facility and find an objective justification for the practice. Also as in the 
Guidance, the CA mentioned the dominant undertaking have a special responsibility to 
protect the competition. On the other hand, it did not refer to the Guidance. There were 
no as efficient competitor test through a cost/price analysis. The decision had a part 
about predatory pricing in which CA considered the recoupment of the losses, price-cost 
analysis. Here, it did not look at the LRAIC. CA analyzed the situation of the market 
and the competitors, actual and likely effects on the consumers but CA did not use same 
cost benchmarks in the Guidance. Thus decision was not compatible with the Guidance.  
 
Another point that could be raised here is that the telecommunications sector is 
regulated by ICTA in Turkey. However the presence of regulation did not preclude anti-
competitive margin squeeze. Besides, despite the regulation, Turkcell can still decide on 
its retail prices on its own. This means that retail prices might have been lightly 
regulated. Although the sector is regulated, CA made investigation on Turkcell. It is 
true that Turkcell was not fined in this case, but this does not mean that CA cannot 
intervene if the sector is regulated. An example to that can be the Deutsche Telekom 
(DT) case 
216
 of the Commission. Despite the regulation, DT was found guilty by the 
Commission and fined.  
 
Finally, TTNET II and Turkcell decisions of CA had tendency to the effects-
based approach. In TTNET II case the consumer harm was not analyzed. However, in 
Turkcell decision CA evaluated the consumer harm but the cost concepts that Turkcell 
used were not completely similar with the Guidance. 
 
 
 
                                                 
215Hatice Yavuz., ―Tek Taraflı Davranışların Değerlendirilmesinde Niyet Unsuru‖ 
Uzmanlık Tezi, Rekabet Kurumu, Ankara, 2012. 
http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/File/?path=ROOT/Documents/Uzmanl%C4%B1k+Tezi/3hati
ceyavuzmiz.pdf 
216
 Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579, Deutsche Telekom AG, Commission 
decision, 21 May 2003.  
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3.5. Turkish Competition Authority Decisions on Exclusive Dealing: 
3.5.1. Mey İçki Decision:217 
 
Mey İçki is a firm that is active in alcoholic beverages sector in Turkey. It was 
accused of abusing its dominant position through exclusive dealing agreements. This 
firm was established in 2004 to privatize the state monopoly, TEKEL, on the alcoholic 
beverages. Most of the turnover of the Mey İçki came from rakı. In this case, CA 
analyzed the market shares of Mey İçki and defined the relevant market as ―rakı 
market‖. CA argued that Yeni Rakı was a must-stock item and Mey İçki had a strong 
portfolio power. This situation made Mey İçki powerful in terms of economies of scale 
and scope. Thus, CA considered Mey İçki as dominant in the rakı market. 
 
In Mey İçki case, CA could not find any proof of anti-competitive intent. 
However, CA found out that Mey İçki made exclusivity agreements with the retailers in 
the downstream market. The incentives that were given by Mey İçki to the dealers were 
free products, target rebates and discounts. A retailer could get one or more than one 
incentives at a time depending on the on-trade and off-trade stores.
218
 Off-trade stores 
could only get free products, but on-trade stores could get all incentives. Firstly, in the 
agreements with off-trade stores there were a certain level of discount, target rebates for 
different product groups such as rakı, wine and beer in terms of litters. There were also 
incentives according to the amount of sales. For example, free products were given to 
the firms that could reach certain targets. However no extra incentives were given if a 
store goes beyond the target.  
 
CA looked at the number of the on-trade and off-trade stores that Mey İçki made 
exclusive dealing agreements and the sales of those stores between 2008 and 2010. It 
found out that the shares of these stores and the number of stores that made agreements 
had decreased. Then CA calculated that the correlation rate between the discount rate 
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 Mey İçki Kararı, 11-12/215-69, 3.3.2011 
218
 In Mey İçki Kararı 11-57/14-76-532, 17.11.2011, p. 5, f.t. 5
On-trade stores (açık satış noktası): where the product presented to end user as opened 
and consumed in the store; restaurants, pubs, bars. 
Off-trade stores (kapalı satış noktası): the product is not consumed in the store, and sold 
to consumers closed; kiosques and markets. 
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with total turnover and the total target was (-0, 05) for off-trade stores. This means there 
was no connection between discount rate, target amounts and the turnover of the off-
trade stores. 
  
Then, CA found that Mey İçki made exclusive dealing agreements with on-trade 
stores and the rate of incentives were determined according to total turnovers of  the 
stores. Mey İçki defined target sale amounts for the products according to market 
activities of the store. On-trade-stores could get more than one incentive at the same 
time. Mey İçki gave volume rebate according to litters. For example for each 100 litter 
of vodka, Mey İçki gave 10 bottles more. Another rebate was given for seasonal 
performance of the store in reaching the target. If the store reached to the targeted litters 
within 3 months, it received incentive payment. 
 
  Besides, CA calculated incentive rates and then calculated two correlations. 
The first correlation was between the rate of incentive and average target of the 
specified product in litters. It was found as (-0.02). The second correlation was between 
incentive rate and total turnover. Here, the correlation was 0.06. This means incentive 
rates and total targets and total turnover were unrelated in on-trade-stores. 
 
After that, CA evaluated the incentive schemes under the target rebates and 
loyalty rebates. CA argued that there were absolute conditions for an incentive scheme 
to be defined as loyalty rebate and to create de facto exclusivity. In incentive system, 
Mey İçki did not require stores to reach target amount as an absolute condition. CA 
stores that could not reach the target amount as an example. It is also added that the 
stores that could not reach the targets could still get seasonal incentives after making 
exclusivity agreements.  
 
It is the performance of the sellers determining volume discounts that the seller 
received. Depending on this point, CA argued that the practice created cost efficiencies 
through economies of scale. Furthermore, a seller could not get additional discounts, 
when it exceeded the threshold. There were no conditions exist in the exclusivity 
agreements between the stores and Mey İçki, which stated that the stores had to supply 
all their needs from Mey İçki.  As a result, the agreements did not have a loyalty 
inducing effect and did not deter stores buying from other beverage companies.  
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When Tobacco and Alcohol Market Regulatory Authority (TAMRA) banned all 
exclusive dealing agreements and the practices that could create the exclusive dealing 
effect in alcoholic beverages market in 2010
219, Mey İçki had to give up its incentive 
schemes and rebates in the market. Therefore, CA concluded that Mey İçki did not 
exclude its rivals by making exclusive dealing agreements.  
 
In this decision, CA did not look at the actual effects of the exclusive dealing 
agreements on the competitors. It calculated the correlations between the sales and the 
incentives and could not find any relations. However, the analysis would be more 
extensive, if CA had looked at the effects on the rivals through sales. Besides, the 
duration of the practice was not considered as significant, since the number of the stores 
and the sale made in the scope of the agreements declined during the practice. CA 
linked the reduction in the sales with non-existence of exclusive purchasing obligation 
and the regulation made by TAMRA that banned the exclusive dealing agreements.  
 
In this decision, CA argued that since there was no exclusive dealing obligation, 
the incentive schemes by Mey İçki were not anti-competitive. It is because of the fact 
that Mey İçki did not hinder stores to buy from the other undertakings and therefore 
loyalty inducing effects of the practice were low. CA continued that the rebate schemes 
could lead to efficiencies by creating economies of scale and reducing the costs. I think, 
this approach to the rebates is in the same line with the Guidance which states that 
exclusive supply obligations can foreclose the market. The Guidance also claims that 
sometimes the rebates schemes can create efficiencies. If there are efficiencies there are 
no anti-competitive effects. This is true; however, CA did not clearly show how it 
reached to the conclusion that the exclusive dealing agreements of Mey İçki did not 
create loyalty effects. To conclude only by saying that if there is no exclusive dealing 
obligation there is no anti-competitive effect, is not sufficient. There should be more 
analysis of the rebates schemes, since there is also the other side related to loyalty 
inducing. The rebates of Mey İçki were retroactive and individualized. The Guidance 
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says that, these types of rebates are more likely to create loyalty effects. This means 
loyalty effect may lead to anti-competitive effects. This is not included in CA‘s 
analysis.  
Therefore, CA should analyze more carefully if exclusive dealing agreements and rebate 
schemes create efficiencies to the market or not.  
 
As the last point, one could say that CA ignores consumer harm. There is 
mention of how all these excluding practices affect consumers. In fact, these practices 
could limit consumer choices and this might have led to consumer harm. If the decision 
had included these factors, deciding on the effects of rebates would be easier. 
 
3.5.2. Turkcell Decision:
220
 
 
Turkcell is a firm that is active in GSM-based mobile services sector. In Turkey, 
there are three firms, Turkcell, Vodafone and Avea, in this sector. It is a highly 
concentrated market. CA defined the relevant markets as ―GSM services market‖ and 
―SIM cards, top-up cards, digital top up, activation and whole and retail selling of the 
other subscription services market‖.  
 
For the evaluation of the dominant position in the market, CA evaluated the 
number of subscribers, total turnovers, sales of top-up cards and the sales of SIM cards 
of three companies. It calculated that the market share of Turkcell was 56 % according 
to number of subscribers and 62 % according to total turnover. The market share of 
Vodafone was 25 % according to number of subscribers and 20 % according to total 
turnover. Avea had 19 % market share according to number of subscribers and 19 % 
market share according total turnover. CA also argued that there were high barriers to 
entry to GSM services market, because of laws that require companies to make license 
contracts with the state and there are high costs of infrastructure investments. By 
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considering of these conditions of the market, CA decided that Turkcell had dominant 
position.   
 
In this decision, there were two issues related to exclusive dealing agreements; 
Mavi Nokta and Smile. Mavi Nokta was a project to make exclusive dealing agreements 
with dealers.
221
 Turkcell offered special advantages to the dealers, which were 
financially strong and which had a large sale volume and located in a critical place. 
These special dealers were called as Mavi Nokta, which constituted a step towards 
becoming distributers
222
 in future. So that these special dealers would have advantages 
such as be collecting invoices, and selling telephones with contracts and campaigns. 
These stores were redecorated and technical commitments were provided by Turkcell. 
Besides, Turkcell did not allow these Mavi Noktas to sell products of Avea and 
Vodafone apart from their top-up cards. At that point, Avea and Vodafone claimed that 
Turkcell had a hindered purpose. That was; it allowed its special dealers to sell top-up 
cards not for the sake of Avea and Vodafone but to inculcate people‘s minds the 
possibility of number portability. In addition, Turkcell made agreements to give 
incentives and premiums to the Mavi Noktas depending on to the amount of Turkcell 
top-up cards they sold. Turkcell did not want Mavi Noktas to put advertisements and 
signs of Avea and Vodafone on their shops.  
 
Then CA looked at the number of lines activated by Turkcell Authorized dealers, 
the number of lines activated by Vodafone, and finally the number of lines activated by 
Avea. Then it found out that the number of Turkcell authorized dealers and shares of 
authorized dealers in activated lines of Turkcell increased whereas the activated lines of 
Vodafone and Avea decreased. In addition to that, CA looked at the number portability 
rates at the time of the Mavi Nokta practice. It found out that Vodafone had net 
subscriber loss, but Avea had net subscriber gain except two months. 
 
The other allegation was about Smile which was the dealer that sold GSM and 
internet services of all three GSM operators. Turkcell did not want its distributors to 
supply Turkcell products to Smile. However, it was not possible to make exclusive 
dealing agreements with the Smile stores, since they had established the idea to sell the 
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products of all three GSM operators. Turkcell, then, refused to supply to Smile 
distributors by controlling all distribution system of distributors and threatening the 
distributors for not providing Turkcell products. According to the decision, distributors 
argued if they sold the products of Smile, Vodafone or Avea, Turkcell punished them 
by taking their POS machines, computers, furniture back; ending the agreements of 
campaigns; or closing the stores. CA also found reports about the strategies of Turkcell 
to keep the demand of the distributors under control by prohibiting those buying 
wholesale products of the other GSM companies.   
 
As a result of those claims, CA decided that Turkcell abused its dominant 
position by making exclusive dealing agreements that limited competition. Then, CA 
imposed a 91.1 million TL fine, which was % 1.125 of its turnover of Turkcell. It also 
required Turkcell to stop the anti-competitive practices and amend its vertical 
agreements. This decision was hotly debated by the CB members. Among them, Murat 
Çetinkaya and İsmail Hakkı Karakelle argued that there was no extensive analysis of the 
intent in this decision. If there is no intent, then the presence of competition on merits 
should be evaluated. They thought that it could be enough to change the conditions in 
the exclusivity agreements; therefore CA should analyze the effects of the practices by 
taking into account the duration. As a result, since exclusivity agreements like those of 
Turkcell‘s could be also made by the rival companies, the stores did not have be an 
exclusive dealer of Turkcell. In fact, the number of exclusive dealers of Avea and 
Vodafone was higher than that of Turkcell and the number of exclusive dealers of all 3 
firms was very low than the other end-dealers.
223
 Besides, market shares of Turkcell had 
decreasing whereas market shares of Vodafone and Avea had increased. The other point 
is that the subscribers made their subscription choices before they go to the end-dealers 
and therefore the role of end-dealers is very low in this sector. Finally Karakelle and 
Çetinkaya argue that more than 30 million people ported their numbers and as a result 
Turkcell had more subscriber loss than Avea and Vodafone had. Therefore it is not 
possible to say that practices of Turkcell had anti-competitive effects. 
 
 In this decision, CA did not analyze the intent of Turkcell. There were many 
documents and e-mails about Turkcell‘s strategies on the dealers, but CA did not 
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analyze if these documents represent anti-competitive intent or not. I agree with points 
of Karakelle and Çetinkaya. In the decision, there was the analysis of effects on the 
market. However, this analysis was incomplete as the aforementioned CB members 
argue. It is not possible to evaluate the case as exclusion of rivals if there was a loss in 
the number of Turkcell subscribers. As the last point, there was no analysis of the 
effects on the consumers or whether the practices limiting consumer choices. If CB 
members are right, consumer welfare might have been increased as the number of 
subscribers who ported their numbers from Turkcell to other operators show. 
Consumers could choose a much more viable option for themselves, so that one could 
say that exclusive dealing agreements of Turkcell did not probably affect consumer 
welfare. As a result, although there was analysis of the market conditions, there were no 
analysis on the consumers, no cost/price tests were made and the analysis on the 
competitor was not enough. It could not be concluded that neither CA decided 
accordingly with the Guidance and nor the decision were effect-based.  
 
Finally, in both Mey İçki and Turkcell decisions CA analyzed the market 
conditions and the situation of the competitors as it is stated in the Guidance. However, 
they did not include the analysis of the consumer welfare. Also the effects on the 
competitors were not completely analyzed. There were no calculations of the cost 
concepts defined in the Guidance so the economic analyses in the decisions were not 
sufficient. Therefore it is not possible to state that Mey İçki and Turkcell decisions are 
in the line with the Guidance and had effects-based approach.  
 
3.6 An Overview of Turkish Competition Authority Decisions through EU Case 
Law Lenses: 
 
In general, Turkish decisions examined in this study are inconsistent in the 
extent to which they adopt the effects-based approach. For example in THY decision, 
the only thing that exists is the evaluation of the practice whereas in Turkcell decision 
of CA in 2010 about margin squeeze; likely and actual effects on consumers and 
competitors are considered in a very detailed way. In fact even in the context of same 
exclusionary practices such as rebates; there are different amounts of analysis. While 
THY decision fails to provide economic analysis, Knauf decision again presents a more 
effects-based approach. The recent EU decisions, on the other hand, are more consistent 
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with the Guidance although to what extent they have effects-based approach is 
controversial. In Intel decision for example, as efficient competitor test is made and 
likely effects of consumers are analyzed. However the hypothetical nature of the likely 
effects can make the decision less effects-based. Despite that debate, one should say that 
the EU decisions are more effects-based that Turkish decisions in any decision 
 
The first exclusionary practice that is examined in this study is predatory pricing. 
The Turkish decisions are Knauf, THY and TDI, and the EU decision I analyze is Post 
Danmark. The CJEU looks at the likely effects on consumers in terms of efficiencies 
and objective justification in Post Danmark decision. Here, there is economic analysis 
with as efficient competitor test, ATC and AIC cost benchmark. As a result, it is 
decided that the practices by Post Denmark can create economies of scale and therefore 
they do not cause consumer harm. In Knauf decision from Turkey, there are calculations 
to some extent and also recoupment of losses; which is not considered necessary by the 
Commission. For example, CA calculated total effective cost (TEC). However the 
contribution of this calculation is not clear in the decision. The CA, then, justified the 
effects with macroeconomic conditions. There is more effects-based approach here 
compared to the THY decision. In the THY decision, the CA does not even look at the 
market share; no calculations are made. Additionally, in TDI decision, CA analyzes the 
possibility of cross-subsidization. CA evaluates the effects on the competitors but there 
were no analysis of the consumer welfare and the efficiencies. Thus, there was no 
consistent approach in those three decisions. Maybe in THY decision there were other 
reasons that CA could not punish and analyzes the decision in a detailed way. As an 
exception there may be political reasons behind THY decision.  
 
 The second exclusionary practice is rebates. In this study, DMG, Kalekim and 
Kale Kilit decisions from Turkey are examined in addition to Tomra and Intel decisions 
from EU. The Guidance did not exist at the time when Tomra decision was decided on. 
Therefore, there actually happened a transformation in the approach from Tomra to Intel 
decision into a more effects-based approach. Since it is consistent with the Guidance 
thanks to tests and cost analysis, the Intel decision presents more economic analysis 
compared to the Tomra decision. Besides, although Tomra presented economic analysis 
in its defense, the Commission did not find it economically rational since it thought that 
the main aim of the firms, which is profit-maximizing, did not exist in Tomra‘s 
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calculations. Intel‘s defense was similar to Tomra, it also included economic analysis. 
The Commission, however, used different data for calculating costs; therefore annulled 
Intel‘s plea. In Turkish Decisions, it is not possible to say that there is more effects-
based approach. The rebates still have per se illegal sides. The CA‘s approach depends 
on decisions in rebates. The consumer welfare was not taken into account whereas in 
Intel decision likely effects on consumers were largely analyzed. In DMG, Kalekim 
decisions and Kale Kilit, there are calculations related to the effects of rebates on 
competitors and whether there are new entries to the market or not. The aim of the 
Turkish decisions here seems to protect the competitor since there is no emphasis on the 
protection of the consumer welfare. However in Kale Kilit decision there are 
calculations of the costs LRAIC and AAC, as efficient competitor test. However, still 
the approach of CA is inconsistent. 
 
The third exclusionary practice is refusal to supply. Telekomunikaja Polska (TP) 
decision is analyzed from the EU, whereas Sanofi Aventis and Türk Telekom and CNR 
decisions are chosen from Turkey. In TP decision, as efficient competitor test is made 
and likely effects on the consumers are evaluated. It has effects-based approach which 
is consistent with the Guidance. Sanofi Aventis from Turkey includes likely effects on 
consumers as well. These effects, however, are not stated clearly in the decision and 
they are considered as negatively despite the fact that they can produce positive 
outcomes in some decisions. Besides, the Sanofi Aventis decision seems to protect 
small distributors instead of protecting competition. This is not consistent with the 
Guidance. Additionally, in both CNR and TTNET, effects on the consumer welfare are 
not evaluated by the CA, which is again something not conforms to the effects-based 
approach and the Guidance. In CNR decision, the definition of refusal to supply is 
debated but only the effects of the practices of CNR on competitors are analyzed. 
 
The fourth exclusionary practice is margin squeeze. Telia Soneria decision is 
chosen from the EU and TTNET I, TTNET II and Turkcell decisions are chosen from 
Turkey. In Telia Soneria decision, the CJEU demands as efficient competitor decision 
which means CJEU required economic analysis. However, on the other hand, it states 
that it was not necessary to evaluate actual effects on consumers. This is a forms-based 
and more moderate approach since it has the way the effects are analyzed and economic 
calculations are conflicting with one another. In the TTNET I decision, consumer 
 96 
 
welfare is not evaluated. TTNET II decision the definition and the requirements of the 
margin squeeze was discussed by the CB members. It was not an effects-based decision 
because the analysis of the effects of the practice on the consumers is missing. The 
duration of the subscriber gains was discussed in this case. In the Turkcell decision, 
however, the actual and likely effects on consumers were analyzed. Within that context, 
one should say that Turkcell decision is more effects-based than any other decision 
mentioned here. It includes more consistent economic analysis than the EU and Turkish 
decisions mentioned within the scope of this study.  
 
Interestingly, Telekomunikaja Polska (TP), Telia Soneria, and Türk Telekom 
decisions are all related to refusal to supply and margin squeeze on the supply of the 
infrastructure of broadband Internet services. Despite that similarity, the views of CA, 
CJEU and the Commission are different. Among these decisions, TP is the most 
consistent one with Guidance and effects-based approach. Telia Soneria is the second 
one, whereas Türk Telekom is the one which considers effects-based approach less. For 
example, the Turkish decision here does not mention anything about the consumer 
welfare. 
 
The last exclusionary practice mentioned in this study is exclusive dealing. For 
EU, there are Soda ash and EDF decisions and for Turkey there are  Mey İçki and 
Turkcell decisions in the study. In Soda ash, no effects were calculated by the 
Commission, so it is a per se decision. In EDF, the Commission made a commitment 
decision and changed conditions of the exclusivity agreements by reducing the duration 
of the obligation since it thinks that the long-term contracts in the EDF have likely anti-
competitive effects. The first EU decision here does not have economic analysis most 
probably because the Commission made these decisions before the publication of the 
Guidance. Also, although the decision of CJEU was given after the Guidance, CJEU did 
not take in to account the Guidance since it was published after the decisions of the 
Commission. 
 
In Mey İçki decision from Turkey, the CA decided that the practices of Mey İçki 
are not exclusionary since they do not include exclusive dealing obligation and single 
branding agreement. Besides, for Mey İçki, the Commission also looks at the 
correlations between the rebates and the total turnover of the distributors. Although it 
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does not consider this as a major factor in its analysis, here one can say that the CA 
makes a more economic analysis. On the other hand, the CA does not look at the effects 
on consumers. Thus, the amount of economic analysis and effects-based approach 
changes decision by decision in both EU and Turkey decisions. However, in EU 
decisions there is much more effects-based tendency especially for the decisions after 
2009. The evaluation of the consumer welfare and the anti-competitive foreclosure exist 
in all EU decisions after in 2009. In Turkcell decision of 2011, the likely effects on the 
consumers were not evaluated, but the effects on the competitors were evaluated. The 
CA made calculations about the situation of the competitors and the market shares after 
the practices of Turkcell. However the amount of economic analysis is very little and 
unsatisfactory since it fails to adopt a broader perspective by looking at some other 
factors such as other subscriber gain of the competitors and the effect on the consumers. 
 
Finally there are some differences between the EU and Turkish decisions. 
Almost all EU decisions are longer than any decision from Turkey, just because of the 
fact that they have more detailed analysis. The amount of the confidential information is 
more in Turkish decisions. For example, just the three of CA cases in this study 
included market shares, they are usually confidential information. Furthermore, it can 
be said that EU cases are more clear and consistent with the Guidance. Especially after 
2009, there is more analysis on consumer welfare in the EU. Considering the decisions 
from Turkey, it could not be concluded that there is a clear and consistent tendency 
towards an effects-based analysis. Besides, the evaluation of the consumer harm and 
likely effects on consumers do not exist in all decisions. As a result, Turkish decisions 
are decided in the direction to protect competitors, but not consumer welfare. This 
means the effects on the competitors such as barriers to entry and exit are more likely to 
be evaluated. Whether the effects on the competitors have a direct impact on consumer 
welfare is not mentioned except several decisions. 
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CONCLUSION: 
 
This study has made an analysis of the most debated and relevant decisions from 
Turkey and the EU about exclusionary practices between 2009 and 2013. The ongoing 
reform process in EU Competition Law is mainly emphasizing an effects-based 
approach rather than a forms-based approach. The Discussion Paper and the Guidance 
are both focusing on the importance of adopting a new and modern approach for 
grasping a much more thorough analysis. The situation is the same for Turkey. CA is 
trying to employ more economic analysis and effects-based approach which looks at 
effects on consumer, efficiencies and objective justifications. 
 
However, it is not easy to say that both EU and Turkey are successful and 
consistent in implementing effects-based approach. In all decisions I have covered, EU 
seems to be more consistent compared to Turkey. But this does not mean that they have 
a thorough effects-based approach. In some decisions, the Commission and CJEU omit 
actual effects of exclusionary practices. The other point that should be emphasized is 
the applicability of the Guidance. Mestmacker argues some of the member states such 
as Germany have stricter competition laws. Here the author makes the following 
comment: It is true that the Guidance is not binding; but what is the point of considering 
the Guidance as the fundamental reference point if it says anything that is not 
mentioned in your national competition law?
224
  
 
The CA‘s approach to exclusionary practices is not consistent either. There is 
more variance in the enforcement of the laws in CA cases. In some decisions CA adopts 
an effects-based approach and makes economic analysis. However, there are decisions 
that include these effects vaguely. Interestingly, almost all EU decisions are longer than 
any decision from Turkey, just because of the fact that they have more detailed analysis. 
On the other hand, it is also true that there is a tendency towards effects-based 
approach; one could not say that all decisions are compatible with the effects-based 
approach of the Guidance. In fact, one could even argue that CA has its own way to 
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make effects-based approach and economic analysis. It may be because CA also tries to 
be compatible with US Competition Law, as it can be seen from the CA decisions. In 
US competition law, the emphasis is effects-based approach but it has some differences 
than the EU
225
. For example; recoupment of losses is required for US
226
 but not need to 
be proven for EU decisions as the Guidance states.  On the one hand, CA uses 
recoupment of losses concept as a benchmark for its decisions. It can be seen in 
predatory pricing, rebates and margin squeeze and predatory pricing decisions; Knauf, 
DMG, Kalekim, Kale Kilit, TTNET I, TTNET II and Turkcell 2010 decisions. On the 
other hand, in some cases CA did not look at the recoupment of losses was not analyzed 
such as THY decision. Although it could be said that THY decision is exceptional 
because CA did not make any economic analysis and there may be political concerns 
behind it.  and the decision had a forms-based approach. However, in the US there are 
not almost any decisions that resulted with punishment due to predatory pricing. Per se 
illegality was EU approach and there are decisions in the EU punished because of the 
predatory pricing and rebates. CA also punished predatory practicing practices. As a 
result, CA approach is more of a mixture between the EU and US approaches. I think it 
is not easy to use both in a compatible way. 
 
Besides, there have been some attempts to bring clarity to Act 4054 Article 4 
about restrictive agreements and acquisitions, which is Article 4 of Turkish Competition 
Law. Like in the EU, Turkey reforms the competition policy toward more effects-based 
approach both in Article 4 and Article 6. Similarly, EU reformed Article 101 and 
Article 102. There is also a new development in Article 6 in the abuse of dominant 
position which is the latest document published by CA in June 18, 2013: The Draft for 
―Guidance on the Assessment of Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant 
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Undertakings‖227 (Draft). The document was published on the website of Turkish 
Competition Authority, and CA will be collecting suggestions until September 8
th
 2013. 
The CA will probably produce the actual document after that time. This is actually what 
EU did with the Discussion Paper. It was published in 2005, and the EU had collected 
comments for a period of time, and then as a result the Guidance was published within 
the last month of 2008.  
 
Before I read the document, I expected to see the Draft would be similar with the 
Discussion paper since both of them are the documents that were made during the 
preparation of guidelines. However, the structure, content and the general approach of 
the Draft is very much the same with the Guidance. These similarities include; the 
objectives of the documents are the same: decreasing uncertainties and increasing 
transparency, guiding competitors and consumers.
228
 Secondly, both the Guidance and 
the Draft look at the abuse of dominant position single dominance and not include 
exploitative practices.
229
Thirdly, they both state that the dominant firm has special 
responsibility not to distort the competition in the market. Fourthly, they both require 
analyzing the market conditions, situation of the dominant undertaking and its 
competitors, expansion and entry and countervailing buyer power in the assessment of 
the dominance. The market share for a firm to be considered dominant is taken as 40 % 
and two year is enough for assessing dominance in both documents. Fifthly, both 
documents emphasize protection of the consumer welfare and the analysis effects of the 
practice and objective justifications by dominant undertakings. Sixthly, they both states 
the duration of the practice and possible or actual evidences of exclusionary strategy 
will be evaluated. Seventhly, both mentions as efficient competitor test, effective price 
with the same cost concepts; LRAIC and AAC. Lastly, they both have exclusionary 
practices refusal to supply, predatory pricing, margin squeeze, exclusive dealing 
agreements, rebates and, tying and bundling. In addition, the things the Commission and 
CA evaluate for the assessment of these practices specifically are very similar in both 
the Draft and the Guidance.  
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On the other hand, there some slight differences between the Guidance and the 
Draft. The relationship between exclusionary conduct and consumer welfare is stated 
directly in the Draft
230
 but the Guidance does not. The rebates and margin squeeze are 
in explained in separate chapters in the Draft. The other titles are the same but 
sometimes in different order. Another difference is that the Draft is not clear in 
recoupment of losses which the Guidance does not require to analyze in the decisions. 
The Draft does not mention whether analyzing the recoupment of losses is necessary. In 
the CA decisions sometimes the recoupment of losses is evaluated for predatory pricing, 
margin squeeze and rebates, as it was the case aforementioned decisions. I think it is 
important for CA to explain its approach on the recoupment in the actual Guidance. 
Furthermore, although it can be understood from the Draft, CA did not say explicitly 
said that their approach will be more effects-based in their web site. However, the EU 
made press releases and speeches that explicitly revealed that the EU would make 
effects-based approach.  
 
These similarities and slight differences may show that CA has been trying to 
adopt effects-based approach as EU does. The documents are almost the same. Does 
that mean CA is leaving US aside? Does the Draft mean CA will adopt effects-based 
approach? All answers will be hypothetical now since the document is very recent. But 
it is a sign of a tendency towards effects-based approach.  
 
The document may be beneficial for the firms to evaluate their behaviors are 
abusive or not and can eliminate inconsistencies of the enforcement of the laws. This 
can also bring CA decisions more economic analysis and standardization in the analysis 
of the exclusionary practices.  
 
On the other hand, the document which will be produced out of the Draft may 
limit CA. Also CA should truly evaluate whether there is a need for such Guidance in 
the market in Turkey. There must be enough cases in Turkey which allow CA  to 
analyze and make its guidance accordingly. Also, CA should analyze the criticisms to 
the Guidance and create its enforcement priorities by looking at the experience of the 
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Commission. I believe CA should not adapt the Guidance but constitute another one 
which reflects its own experience of abuse of dominance. Besides, there are always the 
risks of false positives and negatives. CA can make wrong decisions. This means all 
Guidance-related problems in the EU may arise in Turkey as well such as legitimacy of 
the CA may be questioned if it will not give decisions that conforms their guidance and 
CA may limit itself and give mistaken decisions. Also, it can be hard to calculate the 
cost benchmarks and may get increase the decision-making period of CA that may make 
CA cannot use its resources efficiently.  
 
To conclude, one thing that is clear for me that, more economic analysis is 
needed for all decisions in the market. Ideally case by case decision could provide more 
thorough decisions. But one should not ignore the fact that a rule of reason or case by 
case approach could be time consuming and needs human resources because it requires 
analysis many different things and it may creates uncertainties since it may lift the 
standards of the application of the laws it may end up with wrong decisions.   
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